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Private interhousehold cash transfers are an  These transfers are important to consider
important source of income in many developing  when making policy that is directed toward
countries. Cox and Jimenez'  review of the  certain groups.  Increased public spending on,
lieterature indicates that the percentage of  say, pensions or health benefits, could lower
households receiving private transfers in a  private spending. For example, altruistically
sample of five developing countries ranges from  minded middle-aged households may not givc as
19 to 47 percent. The amounts transferred are  much to their elderly parents if they know that
not trivial - they constitute from 2 to 20  the state would take care of them.  The program
percent of income among all households, and 10  could have the unintended effect of transferring
to 46 percent of income among recipient house-  purchasing power to the private donor.  Also, the
holds.  value of the public program's benefits accruing
to intended beneficiaries would be lower than
Although precise transfer patterns are only  the amount of the public transfer.  Cox and
beginning to be researched, Cox and Jimenez  Jimenez provide a conceptual framework to
review the preliminary evidence from other  show that these displacement effects become
studies and conduct original analysis based on  less important if households are also motivated
the recent Peru Living Standards Survey.  The  by the expectation that they will get something
paper reveals that private transfers are being  in exchange, rather than by pure altruism.
directed toward vulnerable groups in society.
The poor. the elderly, the very young, the  Although such private adjustments do offset
disabled, the unemployed, and female-headed  the impact of public programs, the empirical
households all receive disproportionately more  evidence indicates that it would not completely
transfers than their share in the population. The  eliminate them.  For example, in Peru, Cox and
results can be dramatic and can do more for the  Jimenez estimate the amount that private trans-
poor than public transfer programs.  For cx-  fers from young to old would be raised if social
ample, in Peru, the lowest income quintile's  security payments were eliminated.  The an-
sh.are  in total income is increased by 14 percent  swer?  Private transfers would rise by about 20
as a result of private transfers.  In contrast,  percent, but would not completely compensate
public transfers (mostly social security pay-  for the elimination of social security payments.
ments) increase that quintile's income share by  The displacement effect of private transfers is
only 4 percent.  less than that predicted by the purely altruistic
model.
This paper is a product of the Public Economics Division, Country Economics De-
partment.  Copies are available free from the World Bank,  1818 H Street NW,
Washington DC 20433. Please contact Ann Bhalla, room N10-059, extension 60359
(98 pages with figures and tables).
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Private  inter-household  transfers  are an important  component  of
household income and expenditures  in nearly all developing  countries.
These  transfers  serve  a  variety  of  social  and  economic  functions,  including
insurance  against  income  shortfalls,  support  for  the  elderly  in  retirement,
educational loans,  help during illness and the funds for rural-urban
migration.  Private transfers  help overcome imperfections  in capital
markets.  Some transfers  are business  loans (or repayments). Thus, a
significant  amount  of redistribution  may  occur  within  the  private  sector.
Prlicymakers should pay attention to the connection  between
private  and  public  transfers.  Private  transfers  can  affect  the  formulation
of appropriate  public policy  for a number  of reasons.  First,  private
transfets can mitigate or amplify the effect of public expenditures.
Depending  upon the motive  for giving,  increased  public  spending  on, say,
pensions  or health  could lower  private  spending.  For example,  a public
ptvgram  for old-age  support  might  reduce  incentives  for  younger  households
to help their elderly parents.  The program could  have the unintended
effect  of transferring  income  indirectly  to the  young  by easing  the  burden
of provlding  for their  parents.  Also, the  measured  impact  on recipient
welfare would be less than that predicted had  there been no private
transfer  response  to the program.  Second,  public  revenue  mobilization,
such as income taxation may, perhaps unintentionally,  affect private
giving.  Third, government  regulation  of financial intermediaries  may
restriet access to formal  credit  market to such an extent that inter-
household transfers take up the slack.  Fourth,  private transfers  may
facilitate  labor  mobility  and  household  migration.- 2 -
Up to now, there  has  been little  policy-oriented  research  on this
issue,  primarily  because  the scarcity  of survey  data.  Researchers  have
only  recently  begun  to  study  private  transfers  using  newly  available  survey
micro-data  sets.  Empirical  work is in its  early stages,  and researchers
are  finally  beginning  to  analyze  motivations  for  private-transfer  behavior.
Our research, partly stimulated  by the Bank's special initiatives  on
poverty and on private sector development,  explores  the magnitude  and
determinants  of private transfers  in developing  countries.  This paper
reviews  work done  outside  the  Bank  and  contributes  to that  literature  with
an analysis  of private  transfers  using  the  Peruvian  Living  Standard  Survey
(PLSS),  but many findings  are relevant  for other  developing  countries  as
well.  The PLSS is particularly  appropriate  for the analysis  because it
contains  detailed  information  on income,  remittances,  consumption,  and the
use  of public  services.
The  rest of this  paper  presents  four  essays  (Chapters  2-5)  on the
topic. Chapter  2 surveys  existing  literature  on  private  transfers  patterns
and magnitudes.  It finds that private  inter-household  transfers  are an
important  component  of  household  income  and  expenditures  in  many  developing
countries. For  example,  case  studies  in  El Salvador,  Indonesia,  Kenya,  and
Peru report that about 30 to 50 percent of all households receive
transfers. The  amounts  transferred  are  also  significant.  Transfers  can  be
up to 20 to 40 percent  of recipient  income  in  many cases.  Though  inter-
country comparisons are difficult, due to disposition ^  transfers
definitions  and  sample  coverage,  the  bulk  of survey  evidence  indicates  that
private  transfers  in developing  countries  are important  in terms  of both
incidence  and  amount.Chapter 3 describes private transfer patterns  in Peru using  the
PLSS data.  Private  transfers  flow from high to low.-income  households,
narrowing  income  inequality.  They follow  a pronounced  life-cycle  pattern,
and are targeted  toward  aged and young  hi oeholds.  Households  in their
prime  earning years  (mid-forties) are a  large source of transfers.
Transfers are also targeted toward households affected  by illness  and
unemployment  and  to female-headed  households.  Many,  but  not  all,  transfers
cross  urban-rural  boundaries. These  patterns  tend  to be similar  to those
f'-k,d  in other  developing  countries.
Chapter  4 develops  a theoretical  framework  for  analyzing  motives
for  private  transfers  and  provides  empirical  evidence  on transfer  motives.
A priori,  there  are at least  two  possible  motives  for  private  transfers.
Households  might  give,  with no strings  attached,  simply  because  they  came
about  the  well-being  of members  of  other  households  (altruism).
Alternatively,  households  might  transfer  income  in return  for some  in-kind
quid  pro  quo  on future  monetary  repayment  (exchange).
The  motive  for  private  transfers  will  affect  the impact  of public
income  redistribution. Altruistically-motivated  transfers  can offset  or
completely  neutralize  the impact  of public  transfers. The reason  is that
altruistically-linked  spending units (such  as a child and parent or a
husband  and  wife)  act almost  as one consumer  would. Changes  in incomes  of
individuals  due to, say, a change  in public  subsidies,  would not affect
consumption  of individual  members as long as aggregate income of the
altruistically-lii  d  spending  unit  remained  the  same.  But
exchange-motivated  transfers  interact  with public  policy  much differently,
and  can  even  amplify  the  effects  of public  transfers.
The  evidence  from  Peru  does  not  support  the  altruism  model. Thus,
the  effect  of public  transfer  programs  is  not  neutral.-4-
Chapter  5 investigates  the link  between  private  transfers  and one
important  public  program  --  social  security. Although  the offset  may  not
be complete,  private transfers  still may mitigate  the effect of public
transfers.  But by how much?  The theoretical  framework  is used for an
empirical  study  of the link  between  one  public  program  --  social  security
--  and privatKa  transfers  in Pe.u.  Private  transfers  from young to old
would have been twenty percent higher without social security.  Also,
health  coverage  from social  security  reduces  private  transfers  targeted  to
households  affected  by illness. However  significant,  the  displacement  of
private transfers  is less than that predicted  by models with alruistic
motives.
The  paper  also  suggests  some  directions  for  future  research. This
study can be easily  replicated  for other similar  data bases (such  as in
those countries that are the subject of living standards measurement
surveys). Moreover,  the  scope  of the  work  can  be broadened  to include  the
impact  of other public  subsidies  (e.g.,  education)  on private  transfers.
Also,  more work  can be undertaken to measure non-monetary private
transfers.  Finally,  the studies  focus  only on interhousehold  transfers.
Individual-level data would be required to see what happens intra-
household.-5-
II.  SOCIAL  OBJECTIVES  THQROUH  PRIVATE  TRANSFERS:
A REVIEW
This  chapter  reviews  the  literature  about  private  transfers  with  a
focus  on developing  countries. lie  address  the following  qt'  stions.  How
large are public  transfers? Why do they occur?  What are the empirical
patterns  of private  transfers? Can we anticipate  how they  will react to
public  policy?
A.  The  Size  of Private  Transfer]
Table  1 provides  a listing  of private-transfer  information  for  an
assortment  of countries. We constructed  it from  a variety  of sources,  so
transfer  definitions  are  not  strictly  comparable.  But  the  table  points  out
the importance  of private  transfers  in  many  countries. For example,  among
a sample of urban poor in El Salvador, 33 percent reported  receiving
private  transfers,  and  private  transfer  income  accounted  for 38  percent  of
total income  among recipients.  Ninety-three  percent of a rural south-
Indian sample received transfers from other households.  ~n  Malaysia,
private  transfers  accounted  for almost  one-half  the income  of low-income
households. Nearly  three-quarters  of  rural  households  in  Java in  Indonesia
gave  private  transfers  to other  households.  And about  half of a sample  of
Filipino  households  received  private  cash  transfers.
Rempel and Lobdell (1978)  surveyed  economic  and anthropological
studies  of urban-to-rural  remittances  covering  countries  in Asia,  Africa
and  Latin  America,  and  found  significant  private  transfers  in  virtually  all
instances.  Remittances  accounted  for significant  fractions  of income  in
Tanzania,  Nigeria,  Ghana,  Liberia  and  Pakistan. Further,  private  transfers
are  not strictly  a reflection  of rural-urban  migration. Knowles  and  Anker
(1981),  for  example,  found  that  over  half  of all  transfers  for  a sample  of
Kenyan  households  did  not  cross  urban-rural  boundaries.-6-
Table 2.1.  Private Transfezs in Selected Countries
Average Transfer Amount
Year  Per capit-a  GNP  Percent HH's  (as  percent of income)
Country  Dollars (1986)  Receiving Giving  Receiving  Giving
El Salvador a/  1976  820
Urban poor  33  --  11,38 1/  --
India b/  1975-83  290
Rural households  93  --  8  --
Indonesia (Java)  c/ 1982  490
Rural  31  72  10  8
Urban  44  45  20  3
Kenya  300
Urban d/  1968  --  59  --  3,21 1/
Nairobi e/  1971  --  89  --  21
Nationwide f/  1974  --  27  3  4
Rural  --  19  2  3
Urban  --  62  4  6
Malaysia g/  1977-78  1,830  19/30 m/ 33/47 m/ 11-46 n/  --
Mexico  h/  1982  1,860
Two villages  --  --  --  16/21  --
Peru i/  1985  1,090  22  23  2,9 1/  1,6 1/
Philippines  j/  1978  560  47  --  9  --
USA k/  1979  17,480  15  --  1,6  --
a/  Kaufmann and Lindauer (1986).
b/  Behrman and Deolalikar (1987).
c/  Ravallion and Dearden (1988).
d/  Sample of recent migrants, Rempel and Lobdell (1978).
e/  Sample of poor households, Johnson and Whitelaw (1974).
f/  Knowles and  Anker (1981).
g/  Butz and Stan (1982).
h/  Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1988).
i/  Chapter  3, below,  in  this  paper.  Average  transfer  amount computed as
proportion of total consumption.
j/  Kaufmann (1982).  Cash gifts in a large informal  housing area.
k/  Cox (1987).  Additional information  available in Cox and Raines (1985).
1/  Number after comma denotes amounts among sample of recipients/givers  only.
m/  Numbers before and after slash denote upper and lower  bounds.
n/  Second number denotes proportion for households in .om;est  income quintile.- 7 -
B.  WhX  Private  Transfers  Akre-Ipomtwt
The evidence in table 1 actests to the magnitude of private
transfers,  but size  or frequency  is not  sufficient  reason  to  pay attention
to them.  Transfers are only partly determined  by custom.  Private
tran;tfers  also respond  to social,  economic  and policy factors.  As such
they  could  affect  public  policy  oue-omes  in  ur.expectud  ways.
Consider  a hypothetical  case  of two  related  households,  one  young
and  one  old,  who  pool  and  share  the. resources,  so that  the  consumption  of
individual  members  is  based  on aggregate  income  of the  two.  Introducing  a
social  security  program  that  taxes  the  younger  household  and  subsidizes  the
older  one, but  leaves  aggregated  income unchanged, may  leave the
consumption  of the individual  household  members  unchanged  as well.  The
policy  might  have  no effect  on the  distribution  of well-being.  Further,  if
the program involves  administrative  costs,  both households  could  be made
worse  off.
Consioer a related problem --  evaluating  the effectiveness  of
public health insurance on the distribution  of well-being.  A  simple
approach  is  to subtract  appropriately  valued  health  benefits  from  household
income  and  compare  income  distributions  before  and  after  the  substraction.
But if the program  were really  removed  private  inter-household  transfers
might fill the gap.  A pervasive  network of private safety  nets could
offset changes in public transfers.  Put another  way, public transfers
might  be less effective  than they  look  since  they  could  be "crowding  out"
private  ones.Private  transfers  can affect  calculations  of the distribution  of
income.  Suppose  a data set  contains  a variety  of income  measures  but not
private-transfer  income.  Income  disparity  measures  calculated  from the
data  would  be biased.  Inequality  would  be exaggerated,  for  example,  if the
omitted  private  transfers  flowed  from  high to  low-income  households.
Another  area where  private  transfers  could  figure  prominently  is
that  of credit  markets. These  markets  do not  work  well in many  developing
countries, partly due to the high cost of obtaining information  and
trustworthy  collateral  but also  because  of government  regulation. Private
inter-household  transfers  may act as an informal  credit  market aimed at
overcoming  barriers to borrowing.  If so, policies  designed  to increase
household access to formal credit markets might prompt reductions in
private  transfers. Suppose,  for  example,  that  government  educational  loans
become  available  but, as a result,  parents  decide  to reduce  their  lending
to children  in  school. Private  transfers  mitigate  the  policy's  impact.
Finally,  private transfers  could facilitate  labor  mobility  and
household  migration. Policies  aimed  at helping  workers  to respond  better
to economic  incentives,  say,  by e,sing  rural-urban  migration,  could  simply
prompt  reductions  in  private  transfers.
C.  Motives  for  Private  Transfers
The impact  of private  transfers  on the effectiveness  of public
policy depends on the motives for private transfers.  This section
explains  how. Why do  people  make  transfers?  At least  two  possible  reasons
exist. The first  is altruism. Adult  children,  for  example,  might  give  to
their  parents  because  they care  about them  and get  vicarious  satisfaction
from  giving. Modern  analysis  of altruism's  implications  were developed  by
Becker  (1974). Many  researchers  (for  example,  Adams (1980);  Tomes (1981);Menchik  and David (1983))  have uEed Becker's  model  to analyze  bequests  in
the  United  States. But the altruism  model  has received  less  attention  in
the  development  literature.
Another  conceivable motive  for  private transfers is self-
interested  exchange.  For example,  family  members  might help with home
production or provide other forms of in-kind support in exchange for
financial  transfers. Such exchange  could  be contemporaneous  or part of a
long-term  contract. Cash  transfers  given  today  might  be repaid,  in  cash
or in kind, in future  years.  Economists  have recently  begun to apply the
exchange idea in a variety of settings,  including  household  production
(McElroy and Horney, 1981), private annuity insurance (Kotlikoff  and
Spivak, 1981)  and the exchange  of cash for in- kind services  (Bernheim,
Shleifer  and  Summers,  1985;  Cox,  1987).
Exchange  behavior  is implicit  in many of the analyses  of family
behavior  in the development  literature.  In their  survey  cf the migrant
remittance  literature,  Rempel  and  Lobdell  (1978)  conclude  that  "Remittances
should  be seen  as reflecting  primarily  the self-interest  of the  migrant.n
(p.336)  They suggest that remittances  might aptly be interpreted  as
repayments  for  migration  assistance  or as insurance  premiums  against  income
shortfalls. Rosenzweig  and  Wolpin  (1985)  explain  family-farm  dynasties  as
the outcome of intergenerational contracts that maximize gains from
knowledge  about farm characteristics.  Kaufmann  and Lindauer (1986)  view
private  transfers  as the outcome  of an implicit  social  insurance  contract
among a network of related households,  with transfers to temporarily
disadvantaged  households  acting  as insurance  payments.
Lucas  and Stark  (1985) eschew the strict altruism/exchange
dichotomy  in favor  of an eclectic  approach  that  recognizes  each  motive  as
"tempered  altruism  or enlightened  self-interest."  (p.  901)  Family  members- 10 
enter into insurance contracts to protect against individual income
shortfalls,  and  mutual  altruism  helps  enforce  the  contracts. But Cox and
Jakubson  (1989)  show that often,  even if transfers  are influenced  by both
motives,  in  a given  instance  only  one  will  predominate.
The main reason transfer  molives are important is that they
determine  the  outcomes  of public  income  redistribution.  The  altruism  model
predicts  that public  transfer  programs  have  little  effect on the
distribution  of economic  well-being.  With altruism,  changes in public
transfers  are  simply  offset  by corresponding  changes  in  private  ones.
To see  why this  occurs,  consider  the  main  premise  of the  altruism
model. The donor gives in order to experience  indirectly  the increased
well-being of the recipient.  The donor calculates total pre-transfer
income  and, based on his/her feelings  of altruism  toward  the dependent,
determines  how  much  they  both  will consume  by making  a  private  transfer.
Now suppose  that a public transfer  program  taxes the donor and
gives  the  proceeds  to the  dependent. Combined  income  of the  spending-unit
(defined  as donor  plus  dependent)  has  not  changed and  neither,  presumably,
has the  donor's  attitude  toward  the  dependent. So the  donor's  calculation
of optimal  consumption  for  both donor  and  dependent  will not change. The
only thing that  has changed  is individual,  pre-private  transfer  incomes.
The donor need not make as large a private transfer  to attain desired
consumption  for  the  dependent. The impact  transfers  of the  public  transfer
program  is  completely  offset  by changes  in  private  transfers.
Of course,  not  all  public  transfer  programs  leave  aggregate  income
of the spending-unit  unchanged. Further,  a public  transfer  program  might
give the dependent more than he or she would have received  privately.
Also, many households  neither  give nor receive  private  transfers  and in
these  instances  there  are,  of course,  no private  transfers  to be displacedprivate transfers  that occur with altruism.  Still,  the altruism  model
predicts  that, if altruistic  private  transfers  occur, they diminish  the
effects  of  public  income  redistribution.
In an  extremely  influential article, Barro  (1974) uses an
altruistic  framework  to show how private transfers  can undo the forced
intergenerational  transfers  associated  with deficit  spending  and Social
Security. His analysis  predicts  that,  with operative  private transfers,
the  national  debt  will  not  hurt future  generations  because  older  ones  will
leave higher  bequests,  so  that deficits  matter  little for either
generation.  A  similar argument applies to social security.  Public
transfers  from  young  to old  merely  reduce  private  ones.  Again,  altruism  is
necessary  for  these  results.
Exchange-motivated  transfers  can  interact  with  public  transfers  in
an entirely  different  way.  In fact,  they  can actually  exacerbate,  rather
than offset,  the  effects  of changes  in public  redistribution  on the  well-
being  of  private  transfer  recipients.
To illustrate,  consider  the following  contrived  but illuminating
example.  Suppose  a donor  makes  private  transfers  in exchange  for in-kind
services  rendered  to him by the  recipient  (for  example,  home production).
For every hour  of the recipient's  work at home, the donor pays the
recipient  at the hourly  market  wage rate.  Now consider  the effects  of
taxing  the donor  and subsidizing  the recipient's  wage.  The first  order
effect  of this  scheme  is the  same  as  with two  unrelated  individuals:  that
is,  the  donor  is  made  worse  off  and  the  recipient  better  off. But  a second
round effect occurs.  The donor must pay higher compensation  for the
services  of the  recipient  (who,  as a result  of the  subsidy,  does  not  value
the donor's help as much as before).  This detracts  further from the
donor's well-being, and adds more to that of the recipient.  This- 12 -
"amplification"  outcome  is exactly  the opposite  of that  predicted  by the
altruism  model.
Knowing  the motives  behind  a private transfer  is essential  for
understanding  the connection  between  public  and private transfers.  The
connection  is important  since  nearly  all public  policies,  including  those
that focus  on the economy's  general  performance,  redistribute  income  from
one group  to another. A large  fiscal  deficit,  for  example,  shifts  income
from future generations  to the current one.  The motives for private
transfers  determine  the effects  of deficits  on the relative  well-being  of
generations.
D.  Empirical  Evidence  on Private  Transfers
Empirical  patterns  for private  transfers  indicate  a variety of
functions  and effects:  they  narrow  income  inequality,  function  as social
insurance,  ease borrowing constraints; contribute to human  capital
investment  in  schooling  and  migration;  and  interact  with  public  transfers.
Evidence  on transfer  motives  is mixed.  Some patterns  indicate
altruism,  others  exchange,  and some could  be generated  by either  motive.
We assess  the  evidence  in the  light  of transfer  motives.
1.  Transfers  and  Inequalitv
Private transfers  tend to equalize  the distribution  of income,
especially  by boosting  the  incomes  of the  poorest  households. For  example,
private  transfers  increase  bottom-quintile  incomes  of urban  households  in
Kenya  by 90  percent  (Knowles  and  Anker,  1981). Private  transfers  raise  the
bottom  quintile's  share  of aggregate  consumption  by 14  percent  in Peru  (see
Chapter  3, below,  in this  paper). And they  have a substantial  equalizing
effect  or incomes  in two Mexican  villages  analyzed  by Stark,  Taylor  and
Yitzhaki  (1986). Private  transfers  also lower  the  variance  in log-income
in  the  United  States  (Cox  and  Raines,  1985).- 13 -
At face value, the equalizing effect of private transfers suggests
altruism, and the pattern of rich giving to poor is certainly consistent
with  this motive.  But a closer look at transfer patterns indicates that
altruism may not predominate.  In fact, some transfer patterns run counter
to altruism, and are more consistent  with exchange.
There. are  two  reasons  to question  the  altruistic  motive  for
transfers. First,  the pattern of rich giving to poor is also consistent
with exchange. Suppose, for example, that financial transfers purchase in-
kind services.  If the demand for services is income elastic and the supply
price of services is inversely related to income, a pattern of rich giving
to poor emerges (Cox, 1987).
The second reason to question the altruistic motive comes from a
closer look at transfer patterns.  Higher income households do give more
transfers  (Johnson and Whitelaw, 1974, Knowles  and Anker,  1981 (Kenya);
Ravallion and Dedarden, 1988 (rural households in Java); and lower-income
households are more likely to receive them (see Chapter 2 for Peru); Cox,
1987 (U.S.)).  However, these patterns alone are not a discriminating test
for transfer motives, since they are also consistent with exchange.
A better test comes from the relationship between the recipient's
pre- transfer income and the transfer amounts received.  The two theories,
altruism and exchange, can part ways when it comes to this relationship.
The altruism model predicts that it is always negative.  A shortfall in the
recipient's resources, for example, always prompts more generous transfers.
But  the  exchange  model  admits  a positive  relationship between  the two
variables.  Higher income strengthens the bargaining position of recipients- 14 -
in exchange, so that when their income increases,  they -^an  get higher
transfers.
The empirical evidence on this crucial relationship  is mixed.
Some studies  find  an inverse  relationship  between  recipient  resources  and
transfer amounts received, such as Lindauer and Kaufmann, 1986 (El
Salvador);  Kaufmann,  1982  (Philippines),  Ravallion  and  Dearden,  1988  (rural
households,  Java) and Tomes, 1981 (U.S.,  bequests).  But others find a
positive  relationship,  which contradicts  the altruist  hypothesis,  namely
Lucas  and Stark,  1985 (Botswana);  Cox,  1987 (U.S.);  Ravallion  and  Dearden,
1988 (urban  households,  Java) and Chapter  2  (Peru).  Since the latter
findings  cast doubt  on altruism,  they  also cast  doubt  on the  Barro-Becker
hypothesis  that  public  transfers  merely  crowd  out  private  ones.
2.  Transfers  as Social  Insurance
Private transfers  can insure  against the illness,  disability,
unemployment  and old-age  related  reductions  in earning  potential.  This
insurance  function  may be particularly  important  when publicly  provided
social  security programs are  inaccessible, as is the case  in many
developing  countries.  What is the  evidence?
Old age suDport. Although  many developing  countries  have public
pensions,  most of these  apply  only to urban  workers  in the  formal  sector.
So, except  for some urbanized  countries  (mostly  Latin  American),  coverage
is limited.  And the problem is compounded  by underdeveloped  financial
markets  which lower  the returns  from saving  for retirement  (World  Bank,
1989). Older  generations  have  to rely  on the  young  ior  income  support.
Transfer  patterns  are consistent  with the notion  that transfers
provide  old  age  support. Over  a quarter  of  private  transfers  in  Kenyan  and
Peruvian  samples  were given  to parents  from children  (Knowles  and Anker,
1981;  Chapter  3, below).  Butz and Stan (1982)  and Ravallion  and Dearden
(1988)  found  significant  transfers  from  young  to old in  Malaysia  and  Java- 15  -
respectively.  And, in  Peru,  over  a third  of the  elderly  (aged  61  and  over)
received  transfers--more  than twice the comparable  figure  for those  aged
41-50 (Chapter  4,  below).  As earnings  decline  late  in life,  the  probability
of receiving  a private  transfer  dramatically  increases.
Indeed,  some  argue  that,  in developing  countries,  old  age support
is the main reason  for  having  children. Nugent's  (1985)  recent  review  of
the  literature  on old  age  support  and  fertility  documents  much  controversy,
but most evidence indicates fertility decisions are at least partly
motivated  by  a desire  to insure  against  the  uncertainties  associated  with
old  age. And  old  age  support  from  children  includes  time-intensive  care  in
addition  to  money  (see  Butz  and  Stan,  1982).
These  findings  support  a private-pension  transfer  motive  but they
are  inconclusive because the patterns could be  generated solely by
inadequate  capital  markets.
Disability,  illness and unemnloyment.  Some empirical  evidence
suggests  that  private  transfers  mitigate  the  effects  of  being  disabled,  ill
or unerployed.  In Peru,  households  reporting  illness  four weeks  prior to
the survey  were more likely  to receive  private  transfers. And transfers
apparently  respond  to the  availability  of  publicly-subsidized  medical  care.
In Indonesia,  donors  assist  the  sick  and those  with  recent  births  in  rural
areas but not in urban ones, where access  to public  health clinics is
greater  (Ravallion  and  Dearden,  1988). High-quality  public  health  coverage
also weakens  the connection  between  private  transfers  and illness  in Peru
(Chapter  4,  below).
Despite  their  greater  frequency,  transfer  amounts  targeted  to the
ill in Peru are lower  than those  received  by their  healthy  counterparts.
Exchange  is  a possible  explanation.  Illness  would  limit  the  quality  of in-- 16 -
kind  services  household  heads  provide  for  others,  which  would  reduce
exchange related transfers.
Unemployed  households  have  a  greater  probability  of  receiving
transfers and received greater amounts.  In Peru and in Indonesia, being
unemployed significantly increases  the probability of receiving a transfer,
as well as  the amount of  the transfer (Chapter 3, belos; RavallLon and
Dearden 1988).
Female-headed households.  A consistent pattern across countries
is that females or female headed households have a higher probability of
obtaining  transfers  and  of  receiving  larger  amounts  than  their  male
counterparts  (Salvadorean  households  in  Kaufmann  and  Lindauer  1986;
Botswana  individuals  in  Lucas  and  Stark  1985;  Peruvian  households  in
Chapter 3, below; American households in Cox 1987).  The effect persists
even after holding constant for current income.  Why?
One reason is purely technical.  Females tend to live longer than
males and they may get more transfers due to the old age motives already
discussed above.
Another reason may be  that private transfers compensate females
for discrimination  in the formal  labor market.  Even  though the female
effect is strong even with current income held constant, the transfers  may
reflect past discrimination.  Also, if discrimination holds  females back
from  the  formal labor market,  they may  engage in other activities that
entail transfers  but are, in reality, compensation for services rendered --
such as child rearing or fosterage (Ainsworth 1989).
3.  Migration and Education
Another  connection between  private transfers and risk, analyzed
extensively  by  Lucas  and  Stark  (1985),  is migration.  Households  can
minimize risk by diversifying their "portfolio" of jobs.  A rural family,- 17 -
for  example,  might  send a  family member  to  the urban  formal  sector to
insure against income shortfalls from poor harvests.  Lucas and Stark find
migrant remittances are targeted to  farms with more  risky  (for example,
drought sensitive) assets.
Migration does more than mitigate risk, however.  Like education
and  training,  it  is  an  investment  in human  capital.  Human  capital
investment is most profitable when done early, so that enhanced skills can
be used over a long time span.  But borrowing constraints are likely to be
most severe in the early stages of life.  Private transfers can facilitate
investment in skills by helping overcome such constraints.
Empirical  transfer  patterns  support  the  idea  that  private
transfers are connected to human capital investment.  In Peru, for example,
the incidence of transfer receipts among the young  (aged 15-30) is twice
that of the middle-aged (41-50)--28 versus 15 percent (Chapter 4, below).
And  those with more advanced schooling receive much higher amounts than
those with only a primary education.
Further, private transfers  appear strongly responsive to liquidity
constraints.  In Peru, transfer incidence  mirrors exactly the age earnings
profile:  the chances of  receiving a  transfer are  lowest when  earnings
peak.  And evidence from the United States supports the idea that transfers
are targeted to people who face borrowing constraints (Cox (forthcoming),
Cox and Jappelli (1989)).
E.  Public Policy and Private  Transfers
The  few  available  studies  suggest  a  strong connection between
private and public transfers.  Chapter 4 find that private transfers from
young  to old  in Peru would  have been  20 percent higher  without  Social
Security pension benefits.  Peruvian social security  health benefits dampen
private  transfers as well.  Cox and Jakubson  (1989), find that private- 18  -
transfeis  would have been 14 percent  higher  in the United  States  without
public  income  transfer  programs.
These estimates are lower than the complete "crowding out"
predicted  by Barro  and Becker,  but seem large  enough  to warrant  interest
among policy makers. They are particularly important for developing
countries  where tight budgetary constraints  and adverse macroeconomic
conditions  have forced  made  governments  to  look  for  more  efficient  means  of
undertaking  social programs.  Unfortunately,  the relationship  between
public and private transfers  in developing  countries  has received  very
little  attention. It is  an important  area  for  future  research.
F.  Conclusions
Private transfers in developing  countries are widespread and
responsive  to social  and  economic  conditions,  but  evidence  on their  motives
is mixed. Economic theory suggests that private transfers  should  also
respond  to  public  policy,  and  initial  empirical  work  shows  that  they  do.
Empirical private transfer patterns, such as the following,
indicate  that they may be an important  component  of social  and economic
policy  design:
*  Private  transfers  equalize  income;
*  Private  transfers  are  directed  toward  the  poor,  the
young, the old, women,  the infirm, and the unemployed;
and
*  Public  tax and subsidy  programs  can affect  private-transfer
behavior.- 19  -
The policy implications  are important;  when private behavior
adjusts, there may be unforeseen  or unintended  implications  for public
transfer  programs,  in terms  of who benefits  and  by how much.  Additional
research  is  needed  to complement  and  substantiate  the  few  available  studies
if these  private adjustments  are to be used to make public  policy  more
effective  and  efficient.- 20 -
III.  WHO GIVES AND WHO GETS PRIVATE INTER-HOUSEHOLD
TRANSFERS IN PERU?
High quality data on private transfers are scarce.  Researchers
iust  often  draw  inferences  from  small  samples  and  idiosyncratic  case
studies.  Even  in large  surveys, key variables  like health  status and
unemployment  are  often  lacking.  And  no  survey  to  date  has  gathered
extensive information for  both public and private transfers.
The World Bank's Peruvian Living Standards Survey (PLSS) remedies
many of these deficiencies.  The survey covers a large nationwide sample of
households.  It contains extensive information on the economic situation of
survey respondents, permitting the identification  of vulnerable groups such
as  the  ill, the unemployed, the under-insured and  the poor.  So we can
measure how much more  is given privately to those in economic distress.
Also  the PLSS contains high-quality consumption data.  We can accurately
gauge the impact of private transfers on the distribution of economic well-
being.
This  chapter  is organized as  follows.  First, we  describe the
PLSS.  Next we look at the impact of private transfers on the distribution
of household consumption, and at the insurance function of transfers.  We
then explore  rural/urban differences in private transfers.  Finally, we
look at the connection between public and private transfers.
Findings from the PLSS indicate that private transfers play a key
role  in the economic life of households.  Transfers follow a pronounced
life-cycle  pattern  and vary  according to education.  They  are  targeted
toward the ill, the unemployed and women.  The most novel finding from the
PLSS  is that public policy appears to affect private transfer behavior.
Transfers  vary  depending  on  whether  households  are  covered  by  Social
Security.  This finding could have implications for policy design.- 21 -
A.  Data
PLSS was  conducted  by  the World  Bank  in conjunction with  the
Peruvian  Instituto  Nacional  de  Estadistica  (INE).  The  PLSS  gathered
socioeconomic  information  for  a  sample of  5,109 housAholds,  comprising
about  27,000 persons.  Field work  took place between June  1985 and July
1986.
The household  is the unit of observation for our analysis.  We
deleted  those  with  missing  data  for  any  of  the  following:  private
transfers, age, edutcation  of household head, parental schooling, illness,
household  size,  gender  of household  head,  consumption  and  urban/rural
residence.  The  selection rule  reduced the original sample of  5,109 to
4,184.
The questions on transfers to other households given are contained
in section  11, part E  of the PLSS.  Respondents were  asked:  "Has any
member of your household sent money or goods--regularly  or irregularly--to
persons who are not members of your household during the last 3 months?"
They reported the recipient's relationship to  households head (for  example,
son, parent) and residence (for example, country-side, city).  Respondents
reported the value, in intis (in 1986, US$1 =  14 intis), of cash and tn-
kind  transfers given  in the past three months.  The same questions were
asked for inter-household transfers  received (Section  13, Part B).
Of  the 4,184 households in our sample, 1,216 reported giving a
private  transfer  to another household and 1,144 reported receiving one.
Four hundred and forty six reported both giving and receiving.  Information
on the incidence of private transfers is given  below.- 22 -
Percentage  of Sample
Number  (N  - 4,184)
Households  GiAng  1,216  29.06
Households  Receiving  1,144  27.34
Households  Both  Giving  and  Receiving  446  10.66
Households  Neither  Giving  Nor  Receiving  2,270  54.25
Because  some  households  both gave and received,  we focus  on net
receipts  (in  other  words,  transfers  received  minus  given)  and  net  donations
(transfers  given  minus received)  in what follows.  A household  is a net
transfer recipient if gross transfers exceed those given, and a net
transfer  donor  if  the  opposite  is  true. The  breakdown  of  households  by net
transfer  status  is  given  below:
Percentage  of Sample
Number  (N - 4,184)
Net  Transfer  Donors  978  23.37
Net  Transfer  Recipients  905  21.63
Net  Transfer  Equals  Zero ("Others")  2,301  55.00
Because 446 households both gave and received, some givers are  "net
recipients"  and vice versa.  For simplicity,  we refer to net transfer
recipients  as "recipients"  and  net  transfer  donors  as "donors"  or "givers."
Further,  31 households  both gave and received  the exact  same amount.  So
the "others"  category  in the table  above  contains  2,301  households,  even
through  2,270  neither  gave  nor  received  private  transfers.
Households reported sources and destinations  of transfers  by
relation. The following  is  an  account  of sources  of transfers  received.- 23 -
Number  of  Percentage  of  Percentage  of
T;ansfers  Transfers  Intis  Transferred
1. Parents  281  24.4  28.0
2.  Other  Relatives  279  24.3  16.0
3.  Children  431  37.5  28.3
4. Son  or Daughter-in-Law  26  2.3  5.5
5.  Grandchildren  11  1.0  0.5
6. Spouse  38  3.3  7.6
7.  Non-relative  84  7.3  14.2
TOTAL  1.150  100.0  lQO.O
The majority  of transfers  flow  between  parents  and  children,  though  other
relatives  account  for  a quarter  of the  total. But  the  latter  give  smaller
amounts;  their  share  of transfer  amounts  is 16 percent  (Figure  3.1).  In-
laws, grandchildren, spouses and non-relatives  comprise only a small
fraction  of transfer  sources.  Since  we are looking  at inter-household
transfers,  spouses  account  for  a negligible  proportion  of transfers. For
such a transfer to occur, spouses would have to reside in separate
households,  which  is rare.
B.  Transfers  and  the  Distribution  of  Welfare
Peruvian  patterns  corroborate  the evidence  for other developing
countries  that private transfers have an equalizing effect on  the
distribution  of economic  status  and  well-being.  While  household  income  is
commonly used as a welfare indicator,  reliable  non-wage  income  was not
readily  available  in the  data  base.  Instead,  we follow  other  analysts  who
have used consumption,  which can be interpreted  as a proxy for permanent
income.  (See Glewwe (1988)  and Glewwe and van der Gaag (1988)  for a
similar  justification.)- 24  -
Figure  3.  1
Sourc  of Transfers  in Peru  (Percent)
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To put the figures  in perspective,  consider  the average  transfer
amount  as a fraction  of consumption. The average  transfer  received,  for
the entire sample, was 34.48 intis  per month,  which accounted  for 1.6
percent  of average  monthly  consumption.  (All  inti  values  in this  paper  are
reported  on a monthly  basis.)  The average  transfer  among  recipients  was
159.41  intis,  which accounted  for  8.5 percent  of consumption  for the  sub-
sample.
A second  way to  assess  the  size  of private  transfers  is  to compare
them with  public  transfers from social security.  Social security
retirement  benefits  over  the three-month  period  were 17.80  intis. Private
transfers  are  twice  as large  as Social  Security  retirement  transfers--34.48
versus  17.80.
Private  transfers  have  a  more  pronounced  effect  on  the
distribution  of economic  well-being  than  social  security. Table 3.1  shows
how each type of transfer  affects  the distribution  of consumption. The
second  column  shows  the  distribution  with  all  transfers  removed. In other
words,  this measure  is actual consumption minus private and public
transfers  received,  plus  private  transfers  given,  plus social  security  tax
payments.  Column 3 shows the effects  of private  transfer  receipts  and
donations  on the  distribution  of consumption. Column  5  of the table  shows
the  effects  of public  transfers  on the  distribution;  social-security  income
is added and tax payments subtracted.  Column 7 contains the actual
distribution  of consumption  (in  other  words,  with both private  and public
transfers).- 26 -
Table  3.1. Effeots  of Public  and  Private  Transfers
on the  Distribution  of Well-Being
Share  of Aggregate  Consumption
(Percentage)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
After  both
After  Percentage  After  Percentage  Private  &  Percentage
Consumption  Before  Private  Change  Public  Change  Public  Change
Quintile  Transfers  Transform  from  (1)  Transfers  from  (1)  Transfers  from  (1)
Lowest  4.085  4.643  (+13.66)  4.241  (+3.82)  4.798  (+17.45)
(694  & below)
Fourth  8.768  8.875  (+1.22)  8.785  (+0.19)  8.982  (+1.41)
(695-1,192)
Third  13.814  13.83  (+0.15)  13.839  (0.18)  13.859  (+0.33)
(1,193-1,795)
Second  21.184  21.075  (-0.51)  21.198  (+0.07)  21.089  (-0.45)
(1.176-2,910)
Higbhst  52.189  51.610  (-1.12)  51.975  (-0.41)  51.398  (-1.52)
(2,911  &  above)
Before  private  transfers,  the  lowest  quintile's  share  of aggregate
consumption is 4.085 percent.  After private transfers, the share increases
to 4.643--a  boost of 13.66  percent.  In contrast,  public  transfers  alone
increase the lowest quintile's  share of consumption  to only 4.241--an
increase  of 3.82  percent.  The same  pattern  occurs  for the  next-to-lowest
(fourth)  quintile--  private  transfers  have a greater  impact  on consumption
shares. Public  transfers  actually  raise  the  second  quintile's  share  a  bit,
while private transfers  reduce  it.  Private  transfers  reduce  the highest
quintile's  consumption  share  more  than  public  ones  do.
Much of the variation  in total  consumption  can be explained  by
educational  levels.  The human capital  framework  emphasizes  the role of
education in enhancing income and, thus, consumption.  So it is not
surprising  to find  that  private  transfers  vary  by educational  attainment  in
a pattern  similar  to that described  above  (see  the table  below and  Figure
3.2).- 27 -
Average
Percentage  Average  Amount  Among
Number  Receiving  Amount(Intis)  Recipients(Intis)
No School  674  24.8  15.08  64.50
Initial  of Primary  2,067  20.1  19.23  95.53
Secondary  840  23.5  61.27  261.23
Technical  142  18.3  43.70  238.70
Post-Secondary  111  21.6  45.77  211.67
University  350  21.4  88.59  413.43
The incidence of private transfers eoes not follow  a distinct  pattern
across educational categories,  but amounts do tend to increase  with
education.  Average transfers  for recipients  with no schooling  are only
64.50  intis;  their  university  educated  counterparts  get  413.53  intis. Part
of the education effect is likely to be due to differences  in donor
incomes. University  graduates  are  more likely  to  be linked  to high-income
donors  than  are  those  with  only  primary  schooling.
Transfers  given  are  positively  related  to  educational  attainment:
Average
Percentage  Average  Amount  Among
Number  Giving  Amount(Intis)  Givers(Intis)
No School  675  10.5  14.07  133.57
Initial  or Primary  2,067  22.1  28.01  126.69
Secondary  840  28.5  40.69  143.00
Technical  142  33.1  48.83  147.53
Post-Secondary  111  40.5  206.61  509.38
University  350  34.0  75.99  223.52- 28  -
Figure  3.2a
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C.  Transfers as Social Insurance
Private transfers tend to be  given to those with fewer economic
resources, as indicated  below.
Average
Percentage  Average  Amount Among
Number  Receiving  Amount(Intis)  Recipients(Intis)
<  Median Consumption  2,092  23.7  17.64  74.38
>  Median Consumption  2,092  19.5  51.30  262.53
About 24 percent of households with less than medium consumption received
transfers, compared to about 20 percent of those with greater than median
consumption.  But  recipients  in  the  group with  higher  consumption got
bigger amounts--262.53 intis  versus 74.38.
The economically disadvantaged, measured either by consumption or
unemployment, do not give as much as the more fortunate.  The patterns are
depicted below.
Average
Percentage  Average  Amount Among
Number  Giving  Amount(Intis)  Recipients(Intis)
<  Median Consumption  2,092  15.8  16.61  105.23
> Median Consumption  2,092  31.0  58.90  190.26
Unemployed  1,170  15.8  15.20  96.15
Not Unemployed  3,014  26.3  46.52  176.83
Other  studies  came  to  the .same  conclusion  --  that  private
transfers are targeted towards the poor.  In Kenya, urban households in
middle  income groups gave the largest fractions of their income and the- 30 -
lowest income groups r, eived the most (Knowles  and Anker, 1981).  In
Mexico, remittances  from the U.S. have a profound  equalizing  effect  on
migrants'  home  villages,  although  remittances  from  internal  migrants  embody
a large returns-to-schooling  component  (Stark,  et. al, 1986).  Ravaillon
and Dearden (1988)  find that transfers  reduce  income  inequality  in rural
areas  (and  in  urban  ones  too,  but  only  slightly).
Kaufmann  and Lindauer  (1986)  advance  a stronger  v rsion of the
targeting pattern; social networks direct transfer payments to those
families  with  incomes  below  a "basic  needs"  level. They  conclude  that  "the
performance of the  income variables seems to support the view that
progressive  distributional  outccomes  are  being  realized."  (p.349)
In addition  to compensating  directly  for income,  transfers  also
appear  to act  as social  insurance  for  unemployment,  old  age  and  disability.
Age is one of the most important  variables  affecting  transfer  receipts.
Receipts  are  highest  for the  young  and the  old and least  for the  middle-
aged.  Figure  3.3  shows  this  U-shaped  pattern. The figure  suggests  that
private transfers function in part as an informal  credit system for
households, in other words, a  substitute  for banks and credit  unions.
Access  to credit  markets  is limited  for many Peruvian  households.  They
probably  turn to relatives  and friends  for funds  early  in the life-cycle
when  income is lowest.  The high  incidence of transfers for older
households  could  be  repayments for past loans.  Or  they could be
altruistically motivated transfers, spurred by the desire to boost
resources  for  those  whose  incomes  have  fallen.- 31  -
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Average
Percentage  Average  Transfer
Receiving  Transfer  Amount  Among
Number  Transfers  Amount(Intis)  Recipients(Intis)
Age 15-30  443  27.5  53.38  193.82
Age 31-40  936  17.6  21.87  124.06
Age  41-50  926  14.5  19.11  132.08
Age 51-60  727  1S.7  39.64  201.55
Age  61-70  482  30.1  50.88  169.12
Age 70  and  over  309  40.5  35.02  86.56
The age pattern  for giving  is the exact  opposite  of the one for
receipts.
Average
Percentage  Average  Transfer
Giving  Transfer  Amount  Among
Number  Transfers  Amount(Intis)  Donors
Age 15-30  443  19.9  19.92  100.28
Age 31-40  936  25.5  29.59  115.90
Age 41-50  926  26.3  38.60  146.51
Age 51-60  727  28.2  56.92  201.87
Age 61-70  482  17.4  58.41  335.15
Age 70 and  Over  309  13.3  15.14  114.10
The proportion  giving  first rises  then falls  with age.  But the average
amount for givers,  however,  steadily  rises for all but the highest age
category.
Ravaillon  and  Dearden  (1988)  also  find  that  transfers  are  targeted
to the  elderly  in rural  areas  and  to  both young  and  old in urban  areas  of
Java,  Indonesia  These age patterns suggest that transfers smooth
consumption  for the liquidity-constrained.  Behrman  and  Deolalikar  (1987)
also  find  evidence  for  the  income-smoothing  hypothesis.- 33  -
Another  prominent  pattern is differences  in receipts  by gender;
female-headed  households  receive  more.
Average
Percentage  Average  Amount  Among
Number  Receiving  Amount(Intis)  Recipients(Intis)
Males  3,618  8.3  26.65  145.56
Females  666  39.2  75.87  193.59
Incidence and size of receipts are higher for female-headed
households.  There are three  possible  reasons  for this pattern.  First,
women tend to be poorer so transfers  might be compensating  for income
deficiencies.  Second,  these  transfers  might  represent  payments  for  in-kind
services  provided  to other  households. If  women  are  frequently  involved  in
inter-household  services  (for  example,  childeare),  they  might  receive  more
private transfers.  Third,  part of the gender  effect  may reflect  male-
female  differences  in life  expectancy.  A lot  of  private  giving  goes  to the
elderly,  and women live longer  than men.  So private  transfers  may be
given  to  widows.
A much  higher  proportion  of male-headed  households  give transfers
than female-headed  ones.  Gender differences  in giving are summarized
below.
Average
Percentage  Average  Transfer
Giving  Transfer  Amount  Among
Number  Transfers  Amount(Intis)  Giving(Intis)
Males  3,618  25.2  41.94  166.32
Females  666  13.7  15.74  115.21*  34 -
The average  transfer  among  female  givers  is also  markedly  lower  than  that
among  males.  So the  gender  pattern  for  giving  is the  opposite  of that  for
receipts.
The gender  differences  above  are consistent  with those  found  for
Botswana  (Lucas  and Stark,  1985)  and El Salvador  (Kaufmann  and Lindauer,
1986).  In those countries, female-headed  households have a higher
probability of obtaining transfers and they receive larger amounts.
Similar  evidence  has  been found  for  the  United  States  (Cox,  1987).
Private transfers  appear to respond to economic  distress  (see
below).
Average
Percentage  Average  Amount  Among
Number  Receiving  Amount(Intis)  Recipients(Intis)
Ill  2,164  24.4  32.70  33.76
Not Ill  2,020  18.6  36.39  195.50
UnemployedI  1,170  32.6  60.77  186.12
Not  Unemployed  3,014  17.4  24.28  139.91
A Er<i-ter  percentage  of t'hiose  reporting  illness  (of  either  head or spouse)
four  weeks  prior  to the  survey  received  transfers. But  the  average  amount
among recipients  was higher for those  not ill.  A  greater  fraction  of
households  unemployed  12 months  prior to the survey  received  transfers.
The average  amount  for recipients  was higher  for the unemployed  as well.
These  patterns  suggest  transfers  function  in  part  as  private  insurance.
The proportion  of givers  does not vary with illness,  which is
surprising.- 35 -
Average
Percentage  Average  Transfer
Giving  Transfer  Amount  Among
Number  Transfers  Amount(Intis)  Givers(Intis)
Ill  2,164  23.5  36.06  153.60
Not Ill  2,020  23.3  39.60  10.18
Further,  amounts  given  are  slightly  higher  for  those  not ill.  A possible
explanation  is that  those  prone  to illness,  due  to, zay,  limited  access  to
good water supplies,  might form informal  pr.ivate  insurance  schemes  with
similar households. This behavior would boost the incidence  of both
donations  and  receipts  among  the  ill.
D.  Transfers.  Rural/Urban  Differences  and  MiXra_ton
Receipts  are much higher for urban households  than rural  ones.
The patterns  are listed  below.  Incidence  of receipts  is  higher  for  urban
households  as  well.
Average
Percentage  Average  Amount  Among
Number  Receiving  Amount(Intis)  Recipients(Intis)
Urban  2,241  25.3  57.51  226.89
Rural  1,943  17.3  17.92  45.68
Urban-rural  differences  in donations  mirror  those  for  receipts. Transfers
given  by urban  households  were  more  frequent  and  larger.- 36 -
Average
Transfers
Percentage  Average  Amount Among
Number  Giving  Amount(Intis)  Givers(Intis)
Urban  2,241  27.0  49.02  181.27
Rural  1,943  19.1  24.79  129.47
Survey  respondents  reported  the  sources  and  destinations  of
transfers according to place --  countryside, village, town and city.  So we
can  trace  urban-rural  patterns  in  transfers.  We  used  the  following
convention --  the categories "village", "town" and "city" as urban places
and "countryside"  as rural.  The patterns are depicted  below.
Number of  Percentage of Total  Percentage of Total
Transfers  Transfers  Amount Transferred
Urban to Rural  711  32.54  37.86
Rural to Urban  645  29.52  11.44
Urban to Urban  351  16.06  13.44
Rural to Rural  478  21.88  37.26
TOTAL  2.,185  100.00  100.00
Many  transfers  cross urban-rural boundaries, but a  significant
minority  (38 percent)  occur between  households that reside  in the  same
place (see  Figure 3.4).
What  about  the evidence  in other developing countries?  As  in
Peru, in Indonesia the percent of households receivinlg  transfers is higher
in urban than in rural areas.  But the percentage of households giving is
higher  in rural areas  there.  Average receipts are  also much higher  in
urban than in rural areas 'Ravaillon  and Dearden 1988).  Much of this may
be caused  by urban-rural income differences.4-
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A  significant  proportion  of  transfers  cross  rural-urban
boundaries.  Part  of the  pattern  is likely  to be due to implicit  contracts
among  migrants  and  stayers. Lucas  and  Stark  (1985)  argue  that  in  Botswana,
"to  allocate  certain  members  as migrants  may  be a Pareto-superior  strategy,
and  remittances  are the  mechanism  for  redistributing  the  gains." (p.  914)
Transfers  help spread  the  risk  of migration,  and  help  parents  to invest  in
the education  of youngsters,  who migrate  to town,  to reap returns  and to
repay the initial  outlay.  Similarly,  Knowles  and Anker (1981)  conclude
that,  in Kenya,  "migrants  are  under  a strong  obligation  to send transfers
back to their  home  area  but that  this  obligation  weakens  significantly  the
longer they reside  away." (p. 217)  These results  corroborate  evidence
gathered  from  international  remittance  behavior  in  Mexico  (see  Stark  et al.
1986).
E.  Public  and  Private  Transfers
Private  transfer  patterns  differ  depending  on whether  households
participate  in social  security.  Two examples  are given  below.  First,
consider  the  sample  of  urban  households  aged  60 or over.
Average
Number  Percentage  Average  Amount  Among
(Age  60+)  Receiving  Amount(Intis)  Recipients(Intis)
Receiving  Social
Security  112  25.9  84.33  325.69
Not  Receiving
Social  Security  276  40.9  74.09  180.96
A much higher  proportion  of those without Social  Security  pensions  got
private  transfers  than those  with Social  Security. A possible  reason  is
that social  security  "crowds  out" private  giving. Children  whose  parents- 39 -
are provided  for  by public  transfers  have less  incentive  to contribute  to
their  well-being. But  note also  that  private  transfer  recipients  who also
received  social  security  retirement  income  also  received  higher  amounts,  on
average,  than  their  counterparts  not  receiving  social  security. A possible
explanation  is that those  in the social  security  system  tend to be high-
income  households  with linkages  to  high-income  children.
The social  security  system  provides  health  insurance  coverage  in
addition  to retirement  benefits. And private  transfers  to households  that
are ill differ  depending  on social  security  coverage. This pattern,  for
the  sample  of urban  households,  is  depicted  below.
Average
Percentage  Average  Transfer
Receiving  Transfer  Amount  Among
Number  Transfers  Amount(Intis)  Recipients(Intis)
Ill  & Covered  by
Social  Security  457  24.7  50.29  203.40
Ill  & Not  Covered
by Social  Security  679  33.3  58.16  174.74
Transfer  incidence  is higher  for  urban  households  with  members  who are ill
but not covered  by social  security.  Apparently,  eligibility  for public
health  benefits  "crowds  out"  private  giving  targeted  toward  those  who are
ill.
The last two tables suggest  an interaction  between  public and
private  transfers  which  we will scrutinize  further  in  later  research.- 40 -
F.  Conclusions
As in many other  countries,  private  inter-household  transfers  in
Peru  are  pervasive. Forty  five  percent  of households  are either  donors  or
recipients.  Transfer patterns indicate  that they may be  important in
designing  social  policy.
*  Private  transfers  tend  to  equalize  income.
e  Aside from the poor,  private  transfers  tend to be directed
towards  other  vulnerable  groups  such as the young,  the old,
the  infirm  and  women.
*  The impact  of relevant  policy  change,  such  as tax  reform,  on
private  transfers  should  thus  be monitored.
e  Public  subsidies  may  displace  private  transfer  behavior.- 41 -
IV.  MOTIVES  FOR  PRIVATE  INTERGENERATIONAL  TRANSFERS:
AN ANALYTICAL  FRAMEWORK  AND  PRELIMINARY  EVIDENCE  FROM  PERU
There  are two competing  hypotheses  that explain  transfer  giving.
One is that  households  give  to satisfy  altruistic  feelings. The other  is
that  households  give  because  they  expect  something  in  exchange. These  two
motives imply different outcomes for public  policies  that redist-ibute
income. For example,  Barro (1974)  shows  that  altruistic  households  could
completely  neutralize the forced inter-generational  transfer  associated
with government borrowing by  adjusting their own private transfers.
Changes  in private  inter-generational  transfers  could  likewise  undo  public
social  security  transfers,  education  gnd  health  subsidies  and  other  welfare
programs if households are altruistic.  If households  are motivated  by
exchange,  these  results  do not  necessarily  hold.
Yet rigorous  tests  of the  motives  for  private  transfers  are  only
beginning  to be undertaken.  This is partly  due to a dearth  of quality
data,  even in the  U.S. (Cox,  1987).  There  are almost  none in developing
countries  (see  Chapter  2, above,  in this  paper).
This chapter fills this gap with a case study of Peru.  One
contribution  is that it develops  a rigorous  test  based  on a model  that  is
particularly  apt for developing  countries  --  that of households  that are
liquidity  constrained. Thus, it adopts an inter-generational  approach,
presented  in  Section  A, whereby  transfer behavior  reflects  that- 42
institutional  constraint. Another  contribution  is the  use of a detailed
data  base, described  in Section  B, that  contains  information  about  income,
trAnsfers  and  access  to  publicly  provided  services. Such  data  are  uncommon
in many countries.  Finally,  the paper uses the data and the model to
conclude that exchange is a  stronger  motive for giving in Peru than
a-truism  (Section C). The policy implications of these results are
discussed  in Section  D.
A.  Theory
The  relationship  between  private  transfers  and  income  can  test  the
altruism  and  exchange  motives  for  giving. To show  this,  we present  a  model
based on utility  maximization  by households  (or  heads of  households). In
order  to capture  the  impact  of liquidity  constraints  on inter-generational
transfers, the model is one of overlapping  generations  and works as
follows.
The life-cycle  of an individual  consists  of four periods:  two
"child"  periods  and two "parent"  periods.  During  the child  phase, the
individual  has a  parent  but  no children. When  the  individual  proceeds  from
the child  phase to the parent  phase,  the parent  dies and a new child is
born.  The overlapping  generations  scheme  is depicted  below,  where  k and  p
denote  child  and  parent  phases  respectively.
Periods
Generation  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8
i-l  k  k  p  p
i  k  k  p  p
i+l  k  k  p  p- 43 -
Since the analysis  is aimed at inter  vivos transfers,  the  model
will focus solely  on transfers  that take place  when generations  overlap.
The bequest motive is not operative,  where a bequest is defined  as a
transfer from a parent in generation  i to a parent in generation  i+l.
Conversely,  a parent  in generation  i cannot  borrow  against  the  income  of a
parent  from a future  generation. Transfers  flow  only  between  individuals
in overlapping  generations. To simplify  the analytical  results (without
losing  anything  essential),  we assume  that a child  cannot  borrow  against
future  income,  and  that  the  child  would  rather  borrow  than  shift  own-income
from the child to parent  phase or from period 1 to 2 during the child
phase.  The  parent  has  access  to  capital  markets.
1.  Altruism
With these  assumptions,  the  scheme  can  be reduced  to  a simple  two-
period  model  with  a family  comprised  of two  individuals,  the  parent  and  the
child. Transfers  take  place  when generations  overlap. We now  consider  the
transfer  under  two  alternative  assumptions:  altruism  and  exchange.
With  altruism,  the  parent  cares  about  the  child's  well-being.  The
parent's  objective  function  is:
U - U1(Cpl,  Vl(Ckl))  + U2(Cp 2, V2(Ck2))  (4.1)
(1  +  p)
where  Ui  - parent's  level  of  well-being  in  period  i, i  - 1,2,
Cpi  -parent's consumption  in  period  i
Vi  - child's  level  of  well-being  in  period  i,
Cki  - child's  consumption  in  period  i,
and  p  - the  rubjective  rate  of time  discount.- 44  -
The  function U  is assumed to be  increasing and concave  in each of  Lts
arguments,  and  the subjective rate of  discount is equal for parent and
child.
The  objective  function  is maximized  subject  to  the  following
constraints:
Cpj +  0p2  +  T  +  T2  Epl +  Ep2 (4.2)
(l+r)  (l+r)  (l+r)
Ckl - Ekl +  Tl,  (4.3a)
and
Ck2 - Ek2 +  T2  (4.3b)
where
Epi - parent's earnings in period i,
Ei  child's earnings in period i,
Ti  = transfers made from parent to child in  period i,
and  r  the market rate of interest.
The  nature of  constraints  (4.2) and  (4.3a-b) is  such that  the
parent has access to capital markets but  the child does not.  The child
cannot borrow in the market and must consume out of current earnings and
transfers.
We now solve for an interior solution for transfers.  Define the
individual's  "endowment" marginal utility of consLuption as the marginal
utility of consumption  when no transfers take  place.  In symbols let  us
denote this endowment  marginal utility as [(UJ]I  i =  1,2, j =  p,k.  A
transfer from parent to child in  period i  will take place if  fui  1<  [aui ,
LaCpi J  aCki- 45 -
and write  an expression for the latent variable that detetmines the
transfer  de-'.sion  as:
t  _(8Ui  0o  (J  1JUi  (4.4)
and  Ti >  1  iff  ti  >  0,
Ti - 0 otherwise.
Diminishing  marginal  utility  implies  that:
at 1 <  0  i  - 1,2  ati  > O  i  ' f
8Ekf  aEkf
and  at_  <  0  i - 1,2, f  1,2.
aEpf
The latent variable t* is inversely related to the child's
contemporaneous  earnings  and positively  related  to his earnings  in other
periods.  A rise in contemporaneous  income  eases the child's  liquidity
constraint  in the  current  period,  reducing  t*.  A rise  in child's  earnings
in a period  other  than the current period will raise his  optimal
consumption  profile. With  current  earnings  held  constant,  this  implies  a
*
rise in t . Finally, a rise in  parental earnings, Epi, i - 1,2, increases
the  child's  optimal  consumption  and,  therefore,  t*.  The  comparative  statics
results  for  transfer  levels,  Ti,  follow  precisely  the  same  pattern  as those
for t*
Given an interior solution for private transfers, the child
pursues  a non-liquidity  constrained  consumption  path.  Operative  transfers
imply that the time path for child consumption  is determined by the
following  Euler  equation:- 46 -
8Vk  _  (l+r) BVk  (4*5)
aCkl  (l+p)  8Ck2
This is precisely  the  equation  that  would  have detarmined  consumption  had
the  child  not  been liquidity  constrained.
2.  Exchange  Through  Inter-generational  Loans
In this model, family  members  make transfers  that arise out of
bargaining  over the terms  of an inter-generational  loan.  As before,  the
child is liquidity  constrained  in the first two  periods,  but each family
member cares only about his own consumption. Though family  members  are
selfish,  they  honor  their  commitments.  In  particular,  the  child  will  repay
loans  from  the  parent. The  parent  knows  this  but the  bank does  not.  This
situation corresponds  to the informational  linkage that leads to the
constraint.  We  also  assume  that the  child cannot make borrowing
arrangements  with  anyone  else;  the  parent  is  the  only  source  of funds.  This
assumption  is not necessary  but simplifies  the exposition.  Finally,  the
child  is willing to borrow at rates higher than the market rate of
interest.  The parent,  therefore,  has an incentive  to lend to the child
because  he can earn an above  market  rate of return  on his saving.  For
simplicity,  loan  repayments  take  the  form  of  monetary  payments.
Inter-generational  lending  is a bilateral  monopoly  problem.  The
terms of the loan are determined  by selfish  bargaining.  Let us first
assume that the parent dominates the bargaining arrangement.  Other
bargaining  frameworks  are  considered  L1ter.
Since  the  parent  dominates  the  bargaining,  the  child  receives  his
"threat-point"  utility,  defined  as the  utility  the  child  would  obtain  if  he- 47 -
walked out on the game and pursued a liquidity  constrained  consumption
path. The  child's  utility  function  is:
Vk  - Vl(Ckl)  +  V2(Ck2) _ Vl(Ekl)  +  T  +  V2(Ek 2-R)  (4.6)
(1  + p)  (I  + p)
where  T denotes  parental  loans  and  R denotes  repayments.  The  function  V is
increasing  and concave  in each argument. The child threat-point  utility
level  is
0
0  V2(Ek2)  (4.7) Vk  m V  1(Ekl)  +  2k)(47
(1  +  p)
The  parent's  problem  is to  maximize  the  gains  from  lending,  - T  +  R
(1  +  r)
subject  to the  constraint  that  the  child  remains  in the  game,  in other
0
terms,  Vk  - Vk-
The first issue is the existence of an interior  solution  for
transfers. Define  the  child's  marginal  utility  of consumption  at the
endowment  point  (where  transfers  equal  zero)  as OVk i  - 1,2.  The  parent's
8Eki
gains  from  trade  exist  if  OVk  >  (1  +  r)  OVk  Define  the  latent
aEkl  (l  + p)  aVk2
variables
t_aVk.  (1  + r)  aVk  (4.8)
aEkl  (1  +  p)  dEk2
and  T,  R >  O  iff  t  > O
T  - R - 0  otherwise.
From  the  concavity  of the  utility  function, at  <  0,  at  >  0. The
aEkl  8Ek2
latent  variable  that  determines  the  occurrenc^-  of a transfer  is inversely- 48 -
related  to contemporaneous  child  earnings  and  positively  related  to future
child  earnings. These  results  are  the  same  as those  of the  altruism  model
but the reason  is different. Here, transfers  take place if the child'  s
demand  price for a consumption  loan is greater  than the market rate of
interest.  A  fall in first period earnings  or a rise in second  period
earnings  will increase  the  demand  price.
Three  results  for  the  latent  variable  differ  from  the  altL  Asm
model. First  unlike ti,  the  variable  t is  not  indexed  by time.  If t  > 0,
both transfers  and  repayments  occur. Second,  t does  not  depend  on  parent
earnings. The transfer  decision  is determined  solely  by the relationship
between the child's demand price for a loan and the market rate of
interest. The latent  variable  would  be influenced  by parental  earnings,
however,  given  a connection  between  parental  earnings  and the  interest  rate
faced by him.  Finally, given an  Lnterior  solution, the first period
transfer,  T1, need not be inversely  related  to Ekl.  An increase  in Ekl
raises the child's threat-point,  making  borrowing  terms more favorable.
This can result  in a positive  relationship  between  current  earnings  and
transfers.
Given  that  lending  takes  place,  the  time  path  of child  consumption
is determined by the relationship  between the subjective  rate of time
preference  and  the  market  rate  of interest,  so  that:
aVk  _  (1  +  r) aVk
aCkl  (1  +  p)  aCk2
This is identical  to expression  (4.6)  above.  Despite  the difference  in
transfer  motives,  both altruism  and selfish  bargaining  imply that child
consumption  is determined  by the  Euler  equation  when inter  vivos  transfers
are  operative.- 49 -
The parent-dominates  ascumption  is extreme.  It implies  that  the
child  is  no better  off in the  loan  relationship  than  on his  own.  The  more
realistic (but also more cumbersome)  Nash solution to the bargaining
problem  involves  choosing  T and  R to  maximize  the  Nash  product:
0  0
N - (Vk  -Vk)  (Up  - Up)  (4.9)
0
- Vl(Ekl  +  T) + V2(Ek2  - R)  EV 1 (E)  -)
(1  +  P)  (1  +  P)
x  I  U (W  - T +  R  - U°(W
p PP  (l+r)  P  PJ
where  Up denotes  parent  threat-point  utility  and  Wp denotes  parental
wealth.
The solution to (4.9) implies comparative statics that are
qualitatively  similar  to the  parent-dominates  results.  They also imply  a
more  realistic  outcome; the child receives utility gains  from the
relationship  with the  parent.
The child-dominates solution also produces results that are
qualitatively  similar  to the parent-dominates  case.  In each case, the
probability  of transfer receipt is inversely  related to current  child
earnings  but positively  related  to future  child  earnings.
3.  Transfers  Amounts  and  Altruism  Versus  Exchange
So far  we have looked  at comparative  statics  for transfer  events.
We now focus  attention  on transfer  amounts.  The comparative  statics  are
different  for altruism  versus  exchange. Under  altruism,  transfer  amounts
are inversely  related  to child  earnings,  so that,  for  example,  aTl/aEkl<O.
Exchange  implies  a different  pattern  for the relationship  hecween child50 -
earnings  and transfers. A rise in first  period  child  earnings  diminishes
the demand  for consumption  loans in the first  period,  but also increases
his "threat-point"  utility.  The latter  effect  can cause  an increase  in
first period transfers.  The comparative  statics  results  indicate  that
first  period  transfers  can  first  rise  then  fall  as  with  Ekl. These  results
are  demonstrated  most  easily  with  a simulation.
To show  the inverted  U-shaped  relationship  that  can  occur  between
transfers  received  in the first period  and child earnings  in the first
period, consider a simulation  using logarithmic  utility  for parent and
child  and Nash bargaining. The assumed  parameter  values  are as follows:
Wp - 500,  Ek2 - 100,  p  - .18,  and r - .20. Ekl  varies  from  1 to 65.  We
wish to determine  the path of transfers  as Ekl changes.  The simulation-
results  are  as follows:
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The figure  shows  how, with exchange,  transfers  can first  rise then fall
with earnings. The prediction,  therefore,  is that transfers  received  and
earnings  follow  a non-linear  pattern.- 51 -
C.  Data
The data set used in the empirical  implementation  is the Peruvian
Living  Standards  Survey  (PLSS),  conducted  by the  World  Bank in conjunction
with the Peruvian Instituto Nacional de Edtadistica  (INE).  The PLSS
gathered  socioeconomic  information  for a sample  of 5,109  households,  and
gathered  data for  about  27,000  persons. Field  work for  the  PLSS  was done
between  June 1985  and  July 1986.
The household is the unit of observation  for our analysis.  We
deleted households  with missing  data for any of the following:  private
transfers,  age, education  of household  head,  parental  schooling,  illness,
household size, gender of household  head, consumption  and indicator  of
urban/rural  residence.  This sample  selection  rule reduced the original
5,109  to 4,184.  We confine  our attention  to urban  households. Focussing
on urban  households  reduces  the  sample  size  from  4,184  to 2,241.
Of the 2,241 households in our sample, 757 reported  giving  a
private  transfer  to another  household  and 723  reported  receiving  a  private
transfer  from  another  household. Two  hundred  and  eighty  two  reported  both
giving  and receiving  a transfer.  Information  of the incidence  of private
transfers  in the  sample  is  given  below:
Percentage  of Sample
Number  (N  - 2,241)
Households  Giving  a Transfer  757  33.78
Households  Receiving  a Transfer  723  32.26
Households  Both  Giving  and  Receiving  282  12.58
Households  Neither  Giving  Nor  Receiving  1,043  46.54
Because  some  households  both  gave  and  received  transfers,  we focus
on net  transfers received  (in other words, transfers  received minus
transfers  given)  and net transfers  given (transfers  given  minus  transfers- 52
received)  in the analysis  that follows.  We define  a household  as a net
transfer recipient if gross transfers  received exceed gross transfers
given. A housel;old  is  a  net transfer  donor  if  gross  transfers  given  exceed
gross  transfers  received.
Selected  characteristics  of households  in  the  sample  are  presented
in  Table  4.1  according  to transfer  status. Transfer  status  is  divided  into
net recipient,  net donor and those  households  whose net transfer  equals
zero.  For convenience,  we denote  this group as "others."  Because  282
households  both gave and received  a transfer,  some  givers  are included  in
the "net  recipients"  category  and  some  recipients  are  included  in the "net
donors"  category. For  simplicity,  throughout  the  rest  of the  paper  we  will
refer  to  net  transfer  recipients  as "recipients"  and  net transfer  donors  as
"donors"  or "givers." Further,  24 households  gave and  received  the  exact
same amount. So the "others" category in Table 4.1  contains 1,067
households,  even  though  1,043  neither  gave  nor  received  private  transfers.
Average  income  ranks  highest  for  givers  and  lowest  for  recipients.
The same  is true  for  social  security  income,  which  is indicated  separately
and not included  in the measure  of total  monthly income.  Human  capital
indicators  mirror  the  pattern  for  income. Donors  are  better  educated  than
recipients or "others."  The proportion  of female-headed  households  is
lowest among donors and highest among recipients.  The  incidence  of
unemployment  is highest among recipients  and lowest  among donors.  The
proportion  of households  reporting  some illness  in the  prior  12 months  is
higher  for recipients  than for  donors,  but incidence  of illness  is lowest
among  the "others." The  proportion  of donors  who contribute  to the  social
security  system  is  much  higher  than  the  sample  average.- 53  -
Table  4.1.  Selected  Characteristics  of  Urban
Households  by Private  Transfer  Status
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Net  Transfer Net  Transfer  All
Variables  Recipients  Donors  Others  A/  Households
Income
Total  monthly  income  (intis)  1,368.75  2,233.57  2,029.14  1,917.04
Income  from  compensation  1,348.16  2,204.86  2,007.82  1,893.90
Other income  kI  20.60  28.71  21.32  23.13
Proportion  with social  security  income  0.072  0.083  0.084  0.081
Social  security  income  23.67  30.07  33.12  29.90
Proportion  paying  social  security  tax  0.373  0.520  0.376  0.414
Social  security  tax  payments  10.07  18.96  23.80  19.01
Education
No  schooling  0.069  0.033  0.058  0.054
Initial  0.005  0.008  0.004  0.005
Primary  0.396  0.322  0.421  0.388
Secondary  0.322  0.334  0.300  0.315
Secondary-technical  0.042  0.068  0.049  0.052
Post-secondary  0.040  0.058  0.031  0.041
University  0.125  0.178  0.138  0.145
Other  Characteristics
Age  of  household  head  46.95  44.32  46.07  45.82
Nonmarried  0.076  0.069  0.047  0.060
Female-headed households  0.276  0.094  0.142  0.163
Ill  last  4  weeks  0.537  0.505  0.460  0.507
Unemployed  last  12  months  0.314  0.152  0.212  0.242
Homeowner  0.542  0.526  0.595  0.563
No.  of children  out  of  household  0.57  0.98  0.48  0.64
No.  of children  out  of  household  in  school  0.54  0.92  0.44  0.59
Household  size  4.87  4.84  5.46  5.14
Father's  education  (years)  4.72  4.81  4.32  4.55
Mother's  education  (years)  3.11  3.23  2.92  3.06
Transfers  Proportion  giving  net transfers  0.000  1.000  0.000  0.270
Net transfers  given  (amount)  0.00  181.27  0.00  49.02
Proportion  receiving  net transfers  1.000  0.000  0.000  0.253
Net transfers  received  (amount)  226.89  0.00  0.00  57.51
Proportion  giving  gross  transfers  0.224  1.000  0.022  0.338
Gross  transfers  given  (amount)  11.846  193.21  1.01  55.73
Proportion  receiving  gross  transfers  1.000  0.216  0.022  0.323
Gross  transfers  received  (amount)  238.74  11.94  1.01  64.22
Number  of cases  568  606  1067  2241
a/  Neither  a net transfer  recipient  nor  a net  transfer  donor.
]/  Other  income  includes  income  from  allowances,  insurance,  non-profit
ot-anizations,  interest  and  dividends,  gambling  and  miscellaneous  income.- 54 -
The  family  background  indicators--father's  and  mother's
education--are higher for recipients and givers than for "others."
Household  size  is  also  smaller  for  recipients  and  givers  than  for  "others."
But the proportion  of homeowners  is higher  for "others"  than for either
recipients  or givers.  The number  of children  outside the household  is
highest  for  givers  and  lowest  for  "others."
The average  of net transfers  received  for the entire  sample  is
57.51  intis--3 percent  of total incorme.  To put  these figures in
perspective, they are roughly  double  the comparable  figures for social
security pension income.  (Social ?ecurity is the predominant  public
transfer  program  in Peru.) The  average  net  transfer  given  is  49.02  intis. 1
The average  net transfer  receipt  among recipients  is 226.89  intis--16.6
percent  of recipient  income. The average  net transfer  given  among  donors
is 181.27  intis--8.1  percent  of donor income.  So private  transfers  are
non-trivial  in terms  of  both  incidence  and  magnitude.
The average  age  of recipients  is only  about  two  years  higher  than
that of donors.  But the approximate  similarity  in ages across  transfer
categories  masks  a subtle  and important  age  pattern  in  private  transfers,
which  we discuss  in a later  section.
1/  Curiously,  there  seems  to  be no tendency  to exaggerate  transfers  given
and/or  or under-report  transfers  received. If anything,  any  reporting
bias appears  to go in the  other  direction. This finding  runs counter
to some of the evidence  reported  in Cox and Raines (1985),  in which
reported  transfers  given  often  exceeded  transfers  received  for  a  United
States  cross  section.- 55 -
D.  Empirical  Ratimates
1.  Estimating  Forms
Both  altruism  and exchange  models  predict  that  the  probability  of
receiving  a transfer  should  be inversely  related  to current  income.  Two
forms  of current  income  are in the  probit  equation: total  monthly  income
(denoted  as simply  "income")  and social  security  income.  To capture  the
effects  of income  fluctuations  on transfers,  we also include  dummies  for
whether  anyone  in the  household  has  been ill  or unemployed  during  the  past
12  months,  and  whether  the  head  of the  household  is  a  homeowner.
To gauge  the  possible  effects  of liquidity  constraints  on transfer
behavior,  we enter  dummy  variables  for  educational  attainment  and  age. The
latter  is entered  as a cubic function.  Holding  current income  constant,
education  increases  permanent  income,  which  is  expected  to increase  desired
consumption  and, therefore,  increase  the probability  of transfer  receipt.
The  rationale  for  the  age  variable  is  as follows. With income  constant  and
common age compensation  pr-files, lower age indicates  higher permanent
income for households  early in the life cycle.  For households  at the
beginning of the life cycle, therefore,  an increase in age should  be
associated  with a decrease  in the  probability  of transfer  receipt. Later
in the life  cycle,  as households  are  repaid  for  loans  they  made  to younger
households,  the probability  of transfer  receipt  should  increase  with age.
In sum, the liquidity  constraint--consumption  loans  hypothesis  predicts  a
U-shaped profile for the probability  of transfer  receipt  over the life
cycle.
Previous studies of transfer  behavior indicate  that gender  of
household  head is an important  determinant  of transfer  behavior. Evidence
from developing  countries  (for  example,  Lucas and Stark (1985;  Botswana)
and  Kaufman  and  Lindauer  (1986; El  Salvador)) indicate a positive- 56 -
relationship  between transfers  and female  status.  Similar  evidence  has
been found  for  the  United  States  (Cox,  1987). Further,  marital  status  has
been found  to  be a powerful  determinant  of transfer  behavior  in the  United
States  (Cox,  1987).  And  each  of these  variables  has  a possible
interpretation as an  indicator of the provision of inter-household
services. For these  reasons,  we enter  gender  and  marital  status  dummies  in
the  probit  equation  for  transfer  receipt. We also include  household  size
as a regressor.
To control  for donor's  income,  we include  father's  and mother's
years  of education,  and  the  number  of children  outside  of the  household  and
those  children  outside  of the  household  who  are in  school. 2
Indexing  households  by h and adding  a stochastic  component,  we
express  the  latent  variable  that  determines  the  transfer  decision  as:
th - ao +  alIh +  bXh +  ch,  (4.10)
and  Th  > 0  iff  th  >  0,
Th - 0  otherwise.
When the latent  variable  th crosses  the  threshold  0, transfers,  Th become
positive.  Otherwise,  they are zero.  The variable  Ih denotes  household
income;  the  sign  hypothesis  is al  <  0.  The education,  age  and  demographic
variables  are  denoted  by the  vector  Xh.
2/  In later equations we include more comprehensive  measures of the
donor's  income  potential. (See  Table  5.1).- 57 -
The  estimating  equation  for  transfer  amounts  is  given  by
(1)  (2)
Th  - bo +  blIh +  b2Ih  +  bXh  +  E(lh  Th > 0),  (4.11)
where
I(h  Ih  if  Ih  < Ih  (4.12)
th  Ih  2 *Ih
I(h)  - o  if  Ih 5 Ih
- Ih  - Ih  Ih  >  Ih
and  "h is  a random  error  component.
Income  enters  the  equation  for transfer  amounts  in splined  form.
The bargaining  model  predicts  a non-linear  relationship  between  recipient
income  and  transfer  amounts  received. The  spline  formulation  is  useful  for
testing for the presence of an inverted  U-shaped relationship  between
recipient  income  and transfers. The altruism  model,  on the other  hand,
predicts  negative  coefficients  for  both  b1 and  b2.
2.  Results: Who Receives  Transfers  and  How  Much?
Estimates  of equations  (4.1)  and (4.2)  are given in Table 4.2.
The first two columns  of Table  4.2 contain  the probit  estimates.  Total
monthly income  enters  the probit  equation  with a negative  sign, and is
significant  at the .01  level. The coefficient  indicates  that  a 1,000  inti
increase  in income  is  associated  with  a 1.2  percentage  point  decline  in the
probability  of receiving  a transfer. The coefficient  for  social  security
income is also negative  and significant  at the .01 level.  A  100 inti- 58 -
Table  4.2.  Probit  and  Generalized  Tobit  Estimates
Transfers Received A/
Probit  Generalized  7obit
Asymptotic
Variable  Coefficient  t-value  Coefficient  t-value
Income
Income  -0.379  x 10-4  -2.65  -.-  -.-
Low income  -.-  -.-  0.113  3.38
High income  -.-  -.-  -0.016  -1.12
Social  security  income  -0.725  x 10-3  -2.95  -0.114  -0.60
Education
Initial  0.076  0.18  9.697  0.03
Primary  0.132  0.93  -2.343  -0.02
Secondary  0.153  0.98  114.739  0.92
Secondary-technical  0.014  0.07  64.546  0.39
Post-secondary  0.229  1.08  100.289  0.57
University  0.137  0.75  274.421  1.87
Household  Characteristics
Age  -0.181  -3.46  -0.152  -0.08
Age squared  0.297 x 10-2  2.78  -.-  -.-
Age cubed  -0.142  x 10-4  -2.05  -.-  -.-
Nonmarried  -0.154  -1.14  -40.055  -0.39
Female-headed  household  0.476  5.49  176.562  2.32
Ill  last  12  months  0.197  3.23  -94.460  -1.69
Unemployed  last  12  months  0.426  5.82  140.674  1.87
Homeowner  -0.034  -0.53  59.771  1.07
No.  kids  out  of  h.h.  -0.181  -1.45  14.581  0.14
No.  kids  out  of  h.h. in school  0.179  1.38  -14.607  -0.14
Household  size  0.017  1.25  17.443  1.52
Father's  education  0.014  1.21  16.319  1.73
Mother's  education  0.127  x 10-2  0.10  -1.937  -0.20
Inverse Mill's  ratio  -.-  -.-  -54.478  -0.39
Constant  2.080  2.56  -135.144  -0.51
Recipients  568  Observations  568
Observations  22/1  R-squared  0.10
Log likelihood  -1167.8  F-statistic  2.91
a/  In  probit  analysis,  dependent  variable  is  transfer  receipt--transfer  receipt-i
if transfer  received,  0 otherwise. In Generalized  Tobit  analysis,  dependent
variable  is  net  transfer  amount  received.- 59 -
increase in social security  income is associated  with a 2.3 percentage
point  decline  in  the  probability  of transfer  receipt. 3
Educational  attainment  is  positively  related  to the  probability  of
transfer  receipt,  but its effects  are imprecisely  measured.  The point
estimates  indicate  that  having  a university  degree  raises  the  probability
of transfer  receipt  by 4.7 percentage  points,  compared  to the reference
category  (no  education).
The probit  estimates  ind1cate  that transfers  are targeted  toward
female-headed  households,  and  that  being  unemployed  or ill  during  the  past
12 months  raises  the probability  of receiving  a transfer.  Being female
raises the probability  of transfer receipt by 21.2 percentage  points.
Being unemployed raises the probability  by 15.3 percentage  points, and
being  ill  raises  it  by 6.7  percentage  points.
The  coefficients for the cubic function of age  are highly
significant  and  reveal  a striking  life  cycle  profile  for  the  probability  of
transfer  receipt.  With other variables  set at their sample  means, the
predicted probability of transfer rcceipt at age 16 is 0.625.  The
predicted  probability  then falls,  reaching  a minimum  of 0.184  at age 45.
The probability  rises  throughout  the  rest  of the  life-cycle,  reaching,  f'r
example,  0.423  at  age  65.
Figure  4.1 displays  the life cycle  profile  of the  probability  of
transfer receipt.  Its U-shaped pattern mirrors the inverted  U-shaped
3/  We discuss  the  effects  of social  security  on transfer  behavior  in  more
detail  in  another  paper  (Cox  and  Jimenez,  1989b).- 60  -
Figure  4.  1
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pattern  of the  log  compensation--age  profile  displayed  in  Figure  4.2.  The
log  of compensation  -
1.106 +  0.203(age) - 0.0022(age squared) +  0.668(primary)
(1.64) (7.71)  (-8.34)  (2.52)
+  0.892(secondary)  +  0.596(technical)  +  1.066(post-secondary)
(3.22)  (1.63)  (2.73)
+  1.120(university)
(3.75)
log likelihood  - -5209.34,  non-limits - 1973, observations =  2241.
Figure  4.2 is plotted  with the education  variables  set to sample  means.
The  profile  of log  compensation  shows  the  familiar  concave  shape,  and  peaks
at age 46.4  So the peak of log compensation  coincides  roughly  with the
trough of the probability  of transfer  receipt.  The close relationship
between the two profiles suggests strongly that transfers respond to
liquidity  constraints. Transfer  incidence  falls  when compensation  rises,
and rises when compensation  falls.  The rising part of the transfer
probability  profile  also  suggests  that  transfer  receipts  later  in the  life
cycle  represent  repayments  for  inter-generational  loans.
The next two columns in Table 4.2 contain generalized  Tobit
estimates of transfer amounts. 5 The most important finding is the
4/  We estimate  a cubic  specification  of the  log  compensation  profile,  but
the  cubic  age term  was not  statistically  significant.  A plot  based  on
the  cubic  specification  is  very similar  to  one  in Figure  4.2.
5/  The  probit  equation  used to generate  the inverse  Mills ratio  contains
the same explanatory variables as the probit in Table 4.2, plus
additional  terms.  Income,  age marital  status,  female  status,  illness
and unemployment  are entered interactively. And we use a splined
specification  for income.  The node of the income  spline is set at
3,000 intis.  The reason for this specification  is that the extra
variables  are needed  to identify  the general  Tobit.  Using only the
vector to contained  in the probit  in Table  4.2 construct  the inverse
Mills  ratio  results  in extreme multicollinearity  and  unstable
estimates.- 62 -
estimated  effect  of income  on transfer  amounts  received.  Income  enters  the
generalized  Tobit in splined  form. The  node of the  spline  is  set  at 3,000
intis. 6 At  incomes lower than 3,000 intis, increases in income are
associated  with higher  transfer  amounts  received. A one inti  increase  in
income  prompts  an 11 cent increase  in transfers  received. This positive
coefficient  is estimated  very precisely.  At incomes  higher than 3,000
intis,  a one inti increase  in income  is associated  with about  a 2 cent
reduction  in transfer  receiDts. This  finding  runs  counter  to the  altruism
model, which predicts a large inverse relationship  between income  and
transfer  amounts  received.
Social  security  income  is inversely  related  to transfers  received
but the estimate  is imprecise. The point estimate  indicates  a one-inti
increase in social security income and is associated  with an 11 cent
reduction in transfer amounts received,  but the standard  error of the
estimate  is almost  twice  as large  as the  coefficient  (see  the  next chapter
for  further  analysis).
Education  is positively  related  to transfer  amounts  received  but,
as  int  the probit equation, the estimates are imprecise.  The only
coeft  icient that approaches statistical significance  is that of the
university  degree.  Having  a university  degree  is associated  with a 274
inti increase  in transfer  amounts;  the coefficient  is significant  at the
.06  level.
Age  is far more important  for transfer events than transfer
amounts.  In contrast  to the large  and  precisely  estimated  age  pattern  in
6/  We  varied  the  node  of the  spline  in 500  inti  intervals.  A node  of 3,000
maximizes  the  log-likelihood.- 63 -
the  probit  equation,  the  generalized  Tobit  estimates  indicate  that  age  has
a negligibla  effect  on transfer  amiounts  received. 7
The  findings for the relationships between both female and
unemployed  status  and transfer  amounts  are consistent  with the findings
from  the  probit  estimates. Other  things  being  equal,  transfers  received  by
female-headed  households  are  177 intis  higher  than those  received  by male-
headed households.  And being unemployed  in the past 12 months raises
transfers  received  by 141  intis. To appreciate  the size  of these  numbers,
recall  that the  average  transfer  amount  among  recipients  (Table  1) is 227
intis.
Unlike  the findings  for female  status  and  unemployment,  however,
being  ill  is  associated  with  a  reduction  in  transfer  amounts  received. The
coefficient  indicates  that  being ill in the last 12 months  is associated
with a 94 inti  decline  in transfers. 'The  coefficient  is on the  margin  of
statistical  significance (significance  level - .09).  This finding  is
difficult to reconcile  with altruism.  Under altruism  we might expect
higher transfers for households  affected  by illness,  since it probably
entails  added expenditures  and causes  a decline in well-being.  On the
other hand,  being ill is likely  to reduce  the amount  of inter-household
services  that  household  members  can  perform. Even  those  who  continue  to  do
so will perform  these  service  at a relatively  low  quality  level.  This is
one  possible  explanation  for  the  opposite  signs  for  the illness  variable  in
the  probit  and  generalized  Tobit  equations.
7/  Entering  higher  order terms  for age failed  to reveal  any non-linear
relationship  between  age  and  transfer  amounts  received.- 64  -
The  coefficient  for household  size  indicates  that bigger
households  receive  higher  transfers,  but the coefficient  is rather  small.
A one person  increase  in household  size is associated  with only  a 17 inti
increase  in transfers. The  educational  attainment  of the  household  head's
father is associated  with higher transfers,  but that of the household
head's  mother  is  not.
Marital  status  has  a  negligible  effect  on transfers  received  (both
incidence  and amounts). This finding  contrasts  sharply  with findings  for
the United  States,  which indicate  that  being  married  reduces  greatly  the
probability  of receiving  an inter-vivos  transfer  (Cox,  19&7).8  Further,
the  number  of children  outside  of the  household  has little  effect  on  either
transfer  incidence  or  amounts.
Finally,  the coefficient  on the inverse  Mill's ratio indicates
that sample selection  bias appears not to be an important  problem in
estimating  the  equation  for  transfer  amounts.
3.  Results: Who  Gives  Transfers  and  How  Much?
The first  two columns  of Table  4.3 contain  probit  estimates  for
transfers  given. The  vector  of explanatory  variables  in the  donor's  probit
is  similar to that of the recipient's  probit, except that we add a
quadratic  in  total  monthly  income  and  include  variables  for  social  security
tax  payments.
8/  The  percentage  of  households  in the  PLSS  containing  married  couples  (94
percent) is much higher than the percentages  in the United States
survey  microdata  samples.  The percentage  of households  with married
couples in the President's  Commission  on Pension  Policy  survey  data
sets  used in Cox (1987),  for  example,  was 63 percent  (calculated  from
Table  Bl.p.  544).- 65  -
Table  4,3.  Probit  and  Generalized  Tobit  Estimates
Transfers  Given _/
Probit  Generalized  Tobit
Asymptotic
Variable  Coefficient  t-value  Coefficient  t-value
Income
Income  0.679  x 10-4  3.29  0.012  1.47
Income squared  -0.130  x 10-8  -1.95  -.-  -.-
Social  security  income  0.150  x 10-3  0.96  -0.212  -0.90
Pays  into  social  security  0.337  5.17  -121.448  -1.54
Social  security  tax  payments  -0.157  x 10-3  -0.33  -0.269  -0.50
Education
Initial  0.541  1.32  -124.136  -0.38
Primary  0.080  0.51  -62.635  -0.40
Secondary  0.238  1.40  -47.558  -0.28
Secondary-technical  0.403  2.00  -66.562  -0.34
Post-secondary  0.455  2.11  408.671  1.98
University  0.275  1.44  -24.486  -0.13
Household  Characteristics
Age  04165  2.91  7.513  2.77
Age squared  -0.337  x  10-2  -2.90  -.-  -.-
Age  cubed  0.205  - 10-4  2.71  -.-  -.-
Nonmarried  0.226  1.63  99.858  0.85
Female-headed  household  -0.339  -3.42  -85.256  -0.79
Ill  last  12  months  0.068  1.12  -15.418  -0.29
Unemployed  last  12  months  -0.215  -2.63  -33.412  -0.36
Homeowner  -0.028  -0.44  78.560  1.42
No.  kids  out  of  h.h.  0.155  1.52  -6.861  -0.07
No.  kids out  of h.h.  in school  0.087  0.81  2.375  0.03
Household  size  -0.056  -4.03  -4.549  -0.32
Father's  education  0.290  x 10-3  0.03  39.986  4.18
Mother's  education  -0.015  -1.23  -20.747  -1.92
Inverse  Mill's ratio  -.-  -.-  -55.938  -0.26
Constant  -3.22  -3.65  -147.841  -0.47
Donors  606  Observations  606
Observations  2241  R-squared  0.09
Log  likelihood  -1190.0  F-statistic  2.62
a/  In probit analysis, dependent  variable is transfer--transfer-l  if net
transfer  given,  0 otherwise.  In Generalized  Tobit analysis,  dependent
variable  is  net  transfer  amount  given.- 66 -
The coefficients on income and  income squared indicate the
probability  of giving  a transfer  rises  with income,  but at a decreasing
rate. The  effect  of income  is  positive  throughout  almost  all  of the  income
range  in the  sample. 9 The  declining  marginal  impact  of income  on transfers
given  is quite  different  from findings  for  bequest  behavior  in the  United
States (Menchik  and David, 1983), which indicate  a sharp rise in the
propensity  to give for incomes  in the top 85th percentile. 10 At sample
means,  a 1,000  inti increase  in income  raises  the  probability  of giving  a
transfer  by 2.1  percentage  points.
No clear  pattern  exists  for  the  relationship  between  education  and
the probability of giving.  Educational  categories  with the highest
probabilities  of giving are initial,  technical  and post-secondary  (the
reference  category  is no schooling).  This finding  contrasts  with findings
for inter-vivos  transfers in the United States,  where education  has a
strong  positive  impact  on transfers  given  (Cox  and  Raines,  1985).
The  age  profile  for  the  probability  of transfers  given  is  complex.
The cubic in age is highly significant. Fixing  all other explanatory
variables at their sample  means, the predicted  probability  of giving  a
transfer  at age 16 is 0.117. The  probability  rises  to a peak  of 0.302  at
age 37, then  begins  falling  to a local  minimum  of 0.167  at age 72.  The
predicted  probability  of giving  a transfer  then  rises  sharply  with age for
the  very  elderly, reaching  0.305  for  those  household  heads  aged  90.
9/  The effect  of income  in the donor probit  only turns  negative  after
income  of 26,115  intis.  But only 7 of the 2,241  households  in the
sample  had incomes  higher  than  this.
10/  There is no evidence  for such  non-linearity,  however,  for inter-vivos
giving  in the  United  States  (Cox  and  Raines,  1985).- 67 -
The age profile for the probability  of giving a  transfer is
depicted  in Figure  4.3.  The first  part of the  profile  conforms  roughly  to
the inverted  U-shaped  profile  for log compensation,  but the peak in the
transfers given profile comes nine years earlier  than the one for log
compensation.  The dramatic  upward  curl  in the  transfers  given  profile  that
occurs  after age 72 applies  only to the small  minority  of very elderly
households. Only  4.4  percent  of the  sample  is  aged  72 or  over.  The  upward
curl probably  picks up the effects  of bequests.  For example,  suppose  a
member  of  an elderly  household  dies  sometime  in  the  survey  period. Suppose
he leaves  a survivor  but also bequeaths  something  to another  household.
The survivor  might report  the  bequest  as part of total  private  transfers
given  by the  household.
The  probit  estimates  in  Table  4.3  indicate  that  non-married,  male-
headed,  small  households  are more  likely to give transfers. Being
unemployed in the last 12 months reduces the probability  of giving  a
transfer  but, sutrprisingly,  being  ill  in the  last  12  months  does  not.  The
coefficient  for illness  is actually  positive,  but it is small and only
significant  at the .26  level.
The last two columns  of Table  4.3 contain  the generalized  Tobit
estimates  for transfer  amounts  given.  Transfer  amounts  rise  with income,
father's  education  and age. 11 But amounts  given  are inversely  related  to
mother's education.  Like the estimates  for transfer  amounts  received,
selectivity  bias does not appear  to be an important  problem  in estimating
equations  for  amounts  given.
11/  Experimentation  with higher  order  terms for  age failed  to reveal  any
non-linear  age  pattern  for  transfer  amounts  given.- 68  -
Figure  4. 3
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The probit  and generalized  Tobit  each contain  a vector  of Social
Security  variables: Social  security  income,  a dummy  indicating  whether  the
household  pays social  security  taxes  and the amount  of taxes  paid.  The
estimates  in Table  4.3 reveal  a puzzling  pattern  for the dummy  variable.
Paying  into social  security  actually  increases  the  probability  of giving  a
transfer  but reduces  the  amount  given. The  latter  effect  is  less  precisely
estimated  than the former.  The remaining  social  security  variables  have
very  small  coefficients.
E.  Conclusions
Motives for private transfers  determine  their effect  on public
policy.  An  altruistic motive implies that private transfers will
counteract  the effects  of policies  that attempt  to redistribute  income.
For example,  a social  security  scheme  which  pays out  pension  benefits  and
which is financed  by increased  taxes  will lead to less  private  transfers
from  altruistic  donor  households  to the  elderly.
An exchange  motive  does not necessarily  lead to the  neutralizing
of  public  policy. This  paper  emphasizes  the  inter-generational  loan  aspect
of exchange  --  households  have information  that is unavailable  to formal
lenders  and that can be used to make  welfare  improving  transfers. These
are  primarily  from households  with middle-aged heads  to liquidity
constrained households with younger and elderly heads.  In such a
framework, income redistribution  could even lead to a rise in private
transfers.
The evidence for Peru indicates that private transfers are
directed  towards  the  very  young  and  very old  households. But  pattern  does
not  support  the hypothesis that transfers are  given primarily for
altruistic  motives. The  magnitude  of  private  transfers  received  rises  with
recipient  income  up to  a  point,  and  then  declines. This is  consistent  with- 70 -
with the exchange  motive for transfer  giving.  Thus, private transfers
should  not  completely  neutralize  public  transfers.
The  paper  also  indicates  that  alleviating  liquidity  constraints  --
for example,  by making financial  markets  work better  to allow  households
with younger  and elderly  needs to borrow  --  could  change  the motives  for
giving.  However,  this is a very preliminary  view since  there  are other
exchange  motives  that are also important, such as  social security
(discussed  in  the  next  chapter).- 71 -
V.  THE CONNECTION  BETWEEN  SOCIAL  SECURITY AND
PRIVATE TRANSFERS  IN PERU
How effective  are social  security  retirement  benefits  at raising
the incomes  of older  households  in developing  countries? On the  surface,
it seems that social security  should benefit older households at the
expense  of younger  ones.  A "pay-as-you-go"  social  security  system  taxes
younger  working  households  and distributes  the  proceeds  to those  who have
retired.  But this  simple  assessnment  could  be inaccurate,  due to informal
private  transfer  among  families.
Consider  the (hypothetical)  case  of an elderly  couple  supported  by
their  children. Suppose  a social  security  program  is  creatad,  which  taxes
the  children  and  channels  the  funds  to the  elderly  household. The  children
may  decide to cut back  their support, since  their social security
contribution  accomplishes  what they once did privately.  The children's
response  would  weaken  social  security's  impact  on the income  distribution.
Indeed, some U.S. researchers,  notably Becker (1974)  and Barro (1974),
argue that private transfers  render  social security  programs  completely
ineffective.
Do such  findings  hold  in developing  countries  that  are  considering
reforms in their social securitv system?  Private transfers are an
important  component  of household  income  and expenditure  in virtually  all
the developing  countries  surveyed  by Rempel  and  Lobdell  (1978)  and  Chapter
2 of this paper.  Much of the transfers  flow from children  to parents.
Over a quarter  of private  transfers  in a sample  of Kenyan  households  were
given  to parents  from  their  children  (Knowles  and  Anker,  1981).  Butz and
Stan (1982)  found significant  transfers  from young to old in Malaysia;
Ravallion  and  Dearden  (1988)  discovered  similar  results  in  Java.  In fact,
some  researchers  (for  example,  Leibenstein,  1975)  argue  that,  in  deveioping- 72 -
countries, old age security is the most important  motive for having
children. 12
While the potential  linkage  between  social  security  and private
transfers  has obvious  policy  significance,  there is almost  no empirical
work on this  issue.  Part  of the  problem  is  due to data  deficiencies;  data-
sets containing  both private  transfer  and social  security  information  are
scarce. Many countries  for  which  private  transfer  information  exists  have
no social  security  programs  or devote  only a negligible  fraction  of their
budgets  to  public  income  transfers.  And  using  findings  from  industrialized
countries  with extensive  public  spending  for social  security--such  as the
United States--would  likely be unreliable for making inferences  about
developing  countries. 13 Further,  inter-country  comparisons  among  countries
with data for  private  transfers  are  not feasible  because  of disparities  in
survey  definitions  for  private  transfers  and  sampling  techniques. 14
We use a new data set, the Peruvian  Living Standards Survey
(PLSS),  to assess  the link  between  social  security  and private  transfers.
The PLSS offers  a number  of advantages. First,  a significant  fraction  of
private transfers  flow from young to old in Peru.  Second,  Peru has a
social security  program  which accounts  for over 3 percent  of its Gross
Domestic Product (Suarez-Berenguela,  1987).  Further,  the PLSS contains
12/  A lot of controversy  surrounds  the  connection  between  old  age security
and fertility,  however.  See, for example,  Viassoff  and Vlassoff's
(1980)  article  for  evidence  against  the  old  age  security  hypothesis  and
Nugent's  (1985)  review.
13/  In fact,  private  transfers  from  old to young in the  United  States  are
negligible  (Cox  and  Raines,  1985),  making  the  connection  between  social
security and private transfers difficult to gauge using a cross
section.
14/  For example,  some surveys  count in-kind  time-related  transfers  while
others  do not; some surveys  focus  on low-income  subsamples  and others
use  representative  cross-sectional  samples.- 73 -
labor-market  and demographic  information  necessary to analyze private
transfer  behavior.
Peru is particularly  well-suited  for studying the effects of
social  security  on private transfers.  The country  is an ideal  balance
between  the extremes of very poor nations, like Kenya, which  have
significant  private  transfers  but little  public  transfer  spending,  and  the
United States,  which has a large social security  system  but negligible
private  transfers  from  young  to old.  We control  for  other  determinants  of
private  transfers  in the  Peruvian cross-section to isolate social
security's  private  transfer  impact.
In the sections that follow, we  review theories of private
transfer  behavior  in  more detail  and  describe  the  Peruvian  social  security
system. The  empirical  sections  provide  an overview  of  private  transfers  in
Peru and  test the hypothesis that social security supplants private
transfers.  By way  of preview, we find that social security indeed
displaces  private transfers.  But a complete  "crowding  out" of private
transfers  from  Social  Security,  as  envisioned  by Becker  and  Barro,  does  not
occur.
A.  Theories  of Private  Transfers
The response  of private  transfers  to social  security  depends  on
the  motive  for  private  transfers. The  theoretical  literature  contains  two
primary  views of transfer  motives,  altruism  and self-interested  exchange,
though  recent  work  has  attempted  to  synthesize  the  two  approaches.
1.  Altruism
Modern analysis of the connection  between social  security  and
private transfers  began  with the seminal  work of Barro (1974),  which is
based  on the  altruistic  framework  for  private  transfers  advanced  by Becker
(1974). This  framework  assumes  that  the  utility  of the  child,  Uk, depends- 74 -
on his consumption,  Ck, and the utility  of his parent,  Up.  Tne parent's
utility,  in  turn,  depends  on  his  consumption,  Cp,  so that
Uk  - Uk(Ck,  UpCp)).  (5.1)
The child's  consumption  must equal  his income,  Ik,  knet  of Any  transfers,
T, he makes to his parent.  And the parent's  consumption  must equal  his
income,  Ip,  plus  transfers  received  from  the  child.
Maximization  of (5.1) implies  that transfers  will be given to
achieve the optimal consum'ption  of each family  member.  Each members'
consumption  depends only on aggregate family income, Ik +  Ip not the
distribution  of its components. A social  security  program  that forces  a
transfer  from child  to parent, but  leaves aggregate family  income
unchanged,  will  have no effect  on either  family  member's  consumption. The
child  will reduce  his private  transfer  by the exact  amount  of the forced
public transfer  to keep the consumption  of himself  and his parents the
same.  In sum, the theory  of altruistically  motivated  transfers  predicts
that forced  transfers  from social  security  merely  supplant  private  ones,
leaving  individual  consumption  and  well-being  unchanged. Put another  way,
social  security  transfers  completely  "crowd  out"  private  ones.
2.  Self-Interest
Altruism  is not the only possible  motive for  private  transfers.
An alternative  hypothesis,  common  in the development  literature,  is that
private  transfers  from  young  to old  might  be repayments  for  past  assistance
or insurance  premiums  against  income  shortfalls  (Rempel  and  Lobdell,  1978).
Further,  transfers  from  young  to old  might  function  in  part to pay for  in-
kind services,  such  as  care  of grandchildren.- 75 -
The effects of social security  with self-interested  transfers
differ  from  those  with altruistic  motives. As an illustration,  consider  a
model  based  on pure self-interest,  in  which  neither  parent  nor child  cares
about the  other.  Suppose  inter-vivos  transfers  are self-interested  loans
made from older households  to younger,  liquidity  constrained  ones (Cox
(forthcoming),  Cox  and  Jappelli  (1989)). In this instance,  transfers  from
young  to old are loan repayments.  Changes in social security  would
influence  self-interested  lending  behavior  only insofar  as current  income
and  lifetime  wealth  of generation  members  are  affected.
To see  how self-interested  motives  can generate  results  different
from the altruism  model,  consider  the following  example.  Suppose  social
security  taxes  and  benefits  are increased  in  a  way  that  leaves  the  lifetime
wealth  of younger  generations  unchanged  but make older  generation  members
wealthier.  The current income  of younger  generations  is depressed  but
their  desired  consumption  would remain  unchanged.  If they are liquidity
constrained,  they  would  borrow  more  from  older  generations.  More  borrowing
implies  higher  repayments  to members  of older  generations  later  on.  The
enhanced lifetime wealth of older generation  members reinforces this
effect,  because it puts these  households  in a better  position  to lend  by
lessening  any  credit  constraints  they  may face.  The end result  is higher
transfers from young to old as a result of the expansion of social
security,  which  is  the  opposite  of the  prediction  of the  altruistic  model.
Since  the example  is designed  to illustrate  the  possibility  that
self-interested  motives  can generate  different  outcomes  than altruism,  it
is somewhat  contrived. It is possible  to design  other  examples,  based  on
self-interested  motives, that have qualitative  predictions  similar to
altruism.  For example,  if an expansion  ir.  Social  Security  reduces  the
lifetime  wealth  of younger  generations,  transfers  from  young  to old in the- 76 -
form  of loan  repayments  can  decline. But  the  exact  crowding  out  of private
transfers by public ones, which is the primary result  of the altruism
model,  does  not in  general  occur  with  self-interested  transfer  motives.
3.  A,ltruism  and  Self-Interest
Ths3  pure self-interested  lending  model raises  a question:  if
households  are only looking  after  their  own self-interest,  why would they
repay  loans  at all?  Both  Lucas  and Stark  (1985)  and Kotlikoff  and Spivak
(1981) resolve this problem by positing that a combination  of self-
interested  and altruistic  forces  govern  private  transfer  behavior.  Self-
interested  motives  prompt  households  to enter  an agreement  to,  say,  lend  or
insure.  But  altruistic forces create the mutual trust necessary to
circumvent  the  moral  hazard  inherent  in  such  agreements.
This eclectic  view of transfer  motives  must be interpreted  with
care.  Two  points  are  worth  noting. First,  the  type  of altruism  envisioned
by  the authors  above can differ  from the Barro-Becker  definition.  For
example,  suppose  someone  lends  to two households,  A and B.  Household  A
might  care  very  much  about  the  utility  loss  incurred  by the  lender  from  its
own default. This is a form  of altruism  that  A has for  the lender  and it
makes the contract  enforceable. But A might not care at all whether  B
defaults,  as long as his own consumption  possibilities  remain  unchanged.
If so, this form of altruism  helps  enforce  loan contracts  but it differs
from  the  Barro-Becker  utility  dependence  given  in equation  (5.1).
Second,  even if the  form  of altruism  is of the  Barro-Becker  type,
if it is combined  with self-interested  motives for transfers,  only one
transfer  motive  can determine  the comparative  statics  results  in a given
instance,  depending  on which  motive is operative  at the margin (Cox  and
Jakubson,  1989).  For  example,  suppose  the last  bit of income  transferred
was motivated by  self-interest and purchased some service from the- 77 -
recipient.  In this instance,  marginal  changes in pre-transfer  incomes
induced  by modifications  in social  security  will not produce the Barro-
Becker "crowding  out" results,  even though the donor is altruistic  and
private transfers  occur  The reason  is that altruistic  motives are not
operative  at the margin.  The donor is only inframarginally  altruistic:
that is, he is made happier  if the recipient  receives  a windfall  income
gain but  is not willing to make a  transfer to raise the recipient's
utility. 15
The best way to think  of the connection  between  social  security
and the  motives  for  private  transfers  is in terms  of a dichotomy. Either
the  motive  is  purely  altruistic,  in the  sense  of Barro  and  Becker,  in  which
case social security completely crowds out private transfers.  Or,
transfers  are affected  by some form of self-interested  motive.  In this
case, even if altruistic  motives  are also present,  complete  crowding  out
will  not  occur.
B.  The  Social  Security  System  in  Peru 16
Peru's  social  security  system  (the  Spanish  acronym  is IPSS),  which
began in the early 1890s  as a risk sharing  plan for  blue collar  workers,
covered  about 40 percent  of the economically  active  population  by 1985.
Coverage is mandatory for all wage and salary employees in public or
private  firms  and  cooperatives,  but  self-employed  workers  have  an option  to
participate. Because  of the focus  on wage and salary  work, coverage  is
15/  Further,  the altruism  model  of Barro  and Becker  employs  an important
assumption  about  the  bargaining  framework  between  donor  and  recipient-
-the  donor  dominates.  Alternative  frameworks,  such  as  Nash  bargaining,
do  not imply  the  Barro-Becker  crowding  out  results  (McElroy  and  Horney,
1981;  Cox,  1987;  Kotlikoff,  Razin  and  Rosenthal,  1988).
16/  This  section  draws  heavily  on Mesa-Lago's  (1985) and  Suarez-
Berenguela's  (1Q87)  description  of IPSS.- 78 -
concentrated  in the  high-income  urban  and formal  sectors  of the  economy  -
white-collar  workers,  blue-collar  workers  in large  firms  and  the  military.
The main sources  of funds are payroll  contributions  by insured
persons and their  employers.  In 1987, covered  workers  were expected  to
contribute  5 percent  of  their  salaries  to social  security.  The
corresponding  rate  of contributions  for  employers  is 14  percent,  plus 1-12
percent  for  work injury,  depending  on the  risk  of the  occupation  (US,  SSA,
1987). Self-employed  workers  contribute  15  percent  of their  monthly  income
but the income  basis for their  contributions  is subject  to maximum and
minimum  levels. The government  contributes  to the system  primarily  as an
employer.
Peru's social  sect'rity  system  provides  pension  and health care
benefits. Half  of the  employee  and  employer  tax  revenues  are  earmarked  for
pensions  and  the  other  half  funds  medical  and  maternity  benefits. In  terms
of expenditures,  medical  and maternity  benefits  comprise  a little  under
two-thirds  of IPSS's  total  budget.  Also,  pension  funds  have  been used  to
replenish  the depleted  health  budget.  In 1983,  the system  ran a deficit
equivalent  to  6.7  percent  of total  receipts  (ILO).
Social security medical and maternity  benefits cover only 14
percent  of Peru'3  population. In contrast,  health  care from  the  Ministry
of Health (MOH) covers over half the population.  But Social  Security
health  benefits  are far  superior  to MOH  benefits  in terms  of expenditures
per  person.  Social  Security's  expenditures  per  person  are five  times  that
of MOH.
We will investigate  both the pension  and health  care aspects  of
the social  security  system  in the empirical  work below.  Like pensions,
social  security  health  benefits  can  also affect  private  transfer  behavior.
For example, illness would be  likely to increase the probability  of- 79 -
receiving  an altruistically  motivated  private  transfer. Altruistic  donors
can  increase their well being by making transfers to alleviate the
suffering  of those  who are ill.  But if the  household  affected  by illness
has  high quality  health  insurance  coverage,  altruistic  donors  would  have a
diminished  incentive  to make transfers. The social  security  health  care
system would take over the function  of private transfers.  If private
transfers  are exchange  motivated,  the connection  between  social  Security
health  benefits  and  private  transfers  would  be much the same.  Households
with good  health  insurance  would  have less  incentive  to enter  into  private
insurance  schemes  with other  households. Social  security  health  coverage
would  mitigate  the  financial  risk  of illness  and  diminish  private  transfers
targeted  toward  the  ill.
C.  Data
The data set used  to examine the connection between social
security and transfer  behavior  is the Peruvian  Living Standards  Survey
(PLSS), conducted  by the World Bank in conjunction  with the Peruvian
Instituto  Nacional  de Edtadistica  (INE). T'he  PLSS gathered  socioeconomic
information  for a sample  of 5,109  households  and gathered  data for about
27,000  persons. Fieldwork  for  the  PLSS  was  done  between  June 1985  and  July
1986.
The household  is the unit of observation  for our analysis.  We
deleted  households  with missing  data for any of the following:  private
transfers,  age, education  of household  head,  parental  schooling,  illness,
household size, gender of household  head, consumption  and indicator  of
urban/rural  residence.  This sample  selection  rule reduced  the original
5,109  to 4,184.  Further,  we focus  on urban  households  which  reduces  the
sample from 4,184 to 2,241.  Social security is primarily an urban
phenomenon.  Urban househoslds  account for 85 percent  of social  security
coverage.- 80 -
The questions  pertaining  to inter-household  transfers  given are
contained  in Section  11,  part  E of the  PLSS.  Survey  respondents  were  asked
the  following:  "Has any  member  of your  household  sent money or
goods--regularly  or irregularly--to  persons  who are not members  of your
household during the last 3 months?"  Respondents  also reported the
relationship  between  the recipients  and  household  head (for  example,  son,
parent). Respondents  were  asked  to  report  the  value,  in intis,  of cash  and
in-kind  transfers  given  in the  past three  months. The same  questions  were
asked  for  inter-household  transfers  received  (Section  13,  part  B).
Of the 2,241 households in our sample, 757 reported  giving  a
private  transfer  zo  another  household  and  723  reported  receiving  a private
transfer  from  another  household. Four  hundred  and forty  six reported  both
giving  and receiving  a transfer. Information  of the incidence  of private
transfers  in tne  sample  is given  below:
Percentage  of Sample
Number  (N - 4,184)
Households  Giving  a  Transfer  757  33.78
Households  Receiving  a Transfer  723  32.26
Households  Both  Giving  and  Receiving  282  12.58
Households  Neither  Giving  Nor  Receiving  1,043  46.54
Because  some  households  both  gave  and  received  transfers,  we focus
on net  transfers received  (in other words, transfers received  minus
transfers  given)  and net transfers  given (transfers  given  minus  transfers
received)  in the analysis  that follows.  We define  a household  as a net
transfer recipient if gross transfers  received  exceeds  gross transfers
given. A  household  is  a  net transfer  donor  if  gross  transfers  given  exceed
gross  transfers  received.- 81 -
The breakdown  of households  according  to net transfer  status  is
given  below:
Percentage  of Sample
Number  (N =  4,184)
Net  Transfer  Donors  606  27.04
Net  Transfer  Recipients  568  25.35
Net  Transfer  Equals  Zero ("Others")  1,067  47.61
Because  282  households  both gave  and received  a transfer,  some givers  are
included  in the  "net  recipients"  category  and  some  recipients  are  included
in the "net  donors"  category. For simplicity,  throughout  the  rest of the
paper we will refer to net transfer  recipihnts  as "recipients"  and net
transfer  donors  as "donors"  or "givers." FuiLther,  24 households  gave  and
received  the exact same amount.  So the "others"  category  in the table
above contains 1,067 households, even though 1,043 neither gave nor
received  private  transfers.
The average  of net transfers  received  for the entire  sample  is
57.51  intis--3 percent  of total  income.  To put  these figures in
perspective,  they are roughly  double the comparable  figures for Social
Security  pension  income. The  average  net transfer  given  is 49.02  intis. 17
The average  net transfer  receipt  among recipients  is 226.89 intis--16.6
percent  of recipient  income. The average  net transfer  given  among  donors
is 181.27  intis--8.1  percent  of donor income.  So private  transfers  are
non-trivial  in terms  of  both incidence  and  magnitude.
17/  Curiously,  there  seems  to  be no tendency  to exaggerate  transfers  given
and/or under-report  transfers  received.  If anything,  any reporting
bias appears  to go in the  other  direction. This finding  runs counter
to some of the evidence  reported  in Cox and Raines (1985),  in which
reported  transfers  given  often  exceeded  transfers  received  for  a  United
States  cross  section.*  82 -
Survey respondents  were asked to report the main sources of
transfers received and destinations  of transfers given, according to
generation.  Below is a summary of the primary sources of transfers
received:
Number  of  Percentage  Average  Percentage  of
Source  Transfers of  Transfers Transfer Intis  Transferred
1.  Parents  163  28.7  232.7  29.4
2.  Other  Relatives  149  26.2  136.9  15.8
3.  Children  158  27.8  209.5  25.7
4.  Son  or  Daughter-in-Law  16  2.8  475.3  5.9
5.  Grandchildren  5  0.9  129.1  0.5
6.  Spouse  22  3.4  434.9  7.4
7.  Non-relatives  55  9.7  356.8  15.2
TOTAL  568  100.0  226.9  100.0
Most of the transfers  occur  between  parents  and children. After
these two categories,  the most significant  is that of "other  relatives,"
who are  the  source  of over  a quarter  of the  transfers  received,  though  only
16 percent  of total  intis  received. Very  few  transfers  received  originated
with grandchildren,  in-laws or spouses.  Non-relatives  account for a
significant  minority  of transfers. 18
D.  Empirical  Estimates
1.  Estimating  Eauations
We start by specifying  an estimating  equation  for transfer
received  by households  with older heads from those with younger  heads.
There  are two  questions  to explore. First,  what is the  connection  between
social  security  and  transfer  events? Second,  given  that  a transfer  occurs,
18/  Note  that since  we  are  looking  at  inter-household  transfers,
inter-spousal  transfers  cannot  occur  unless  the spouses  are living  in
separate  households.- 83 -
how  does  social  security affect transfer amounts received?  These
estimating  equations  can be derived  from the theoretical  models  described
in  the  previous  section  (see  Chapter  4, above,  for  a  more  detailed  model).
We use probit  analysis  to analyze  the  first  question. We focus  on
the sample  of households  aged 45 or over.  Indexing  households  by h and
adding a  stochastic component, we  express the latent variable that
determines  the  transfer  decision  as
th - ao +  aIh +  bXh -'h'  (5.2)
and  Th  > 0  iff  th  >  ,
Th =  0  otherwise.
When the  latent  variable  th crosses  the threshold  0, transfers,  Th become
positive. Otherwise,  they  are  zero. The  vector  Ih is  a set  of pre-private
transfer  income  variables,  and  Xh is a  vector  of education  and  demographic
variables. The  stochastic  component  Eh  is  assumed  normally  distributed.
We include  three  variables  in the vector Ih:  a dummy  variable
indicating  whether the household receives social security income, the
Social security income amount, and non-social security income, which
includes  earnings,  financial  income  and income  from a variety  of other
sources  (for  example,  gambling,  rental  income).
The  vector  Xh  captures  the  effects  of  transitory  income
fluctuations  on transfers. It contains  dummies  for  whether  anyone  in the
household  has been ill  during  the  last  four  weeks  or unemployed  during  the
last  12  months. To measure  additional  household  resources,  we also include
a dummy indicating  whether the household is a homeowner, dummies for
educational  level  and  a cubic  ir  age.- 84 -
Previous studies of transfer behavior indicate that the gender of
the household  head  is  an  important  determinant  of  transfer  behavior.
Evidence  from developing countries (for example, Lucas  and Stark  (1985;
Botswana)  and  Kaufmann  and  Lindauer  (1986;  El  Salvador))  indicate  a
positive  relationship  between  transfers  and  female  status.  Similar
evidence has been found for the United States (Cox, 1987).  So we enter a
dummy variable indicating whether the household head  is female.  We also
include  dummy  variables  for marital  status and  the number  of children
outside  the household, and whether the household has no  children living
outside the household.  And we include  household size as a regressor.
The estimating equation for transfer amounts is given by:
Th  co +  cIh +  dXh +  E(nh I  Th >  0),  (5.3)
where nh is a random error component.  The specification  of the generalized
Tobit  equation  for  transfer  amounts  is  similar  to  that of  the probit
equation, except we enter age linearly and do not include the variable for
no children outside the household. 19
2.  Results
Table 5.1 contains the probit and generalized Tobit estimates.  The
dummy  variable  for whether  the  household  receives  income  from  Social
Security is negative, large and statistically significant at the .01  level.
At  sample  means,  having  income  from  social  security  reduces  the
19/ The probit equation used  to generate the inverse Mills  ratio in the
generalized Tobit contains the same vector of  explanatory variables as
the  probit  in  equation  (5.2) plus  additional  terms.  Income, age,
marital  status, female status,  illness and  unemployment are entered
interactively.  And we use a  splined specification for income.  The
node  of  spline  is  set  at  3,000  intis.  The  reason  for  this
specification is that the extra variables are needed to identify the
generalized Tobit.  Using only the vector contained in equation (5.2)
resulted in extreme multicollinearity and unstable estimates.- 85  -
Table  5.1: Probit  and  Generalized  Tobit  Estimates
Transfers  from  Young to  Old
Transfers  Received  a/
Probit  Generalized  Tobit
Asymptotic
Variable  Coefficient  t-value  Mean  Coefficient  t-value  Mean
Income
Income  -0.257  x 10-4  -1.02  2261.200  0.026  1.07  1373.700
Has Soc.  Sec.  -0.609  -3.43  0.149  86.754  0.43  0.127
Soc.  Sec.  inc.  0.164  x 10-3  0.76  56.011  -0.153  -0.68  53.381
Education  b/
Initial  -3.392  -0.13  0.008  -.-  -.-  -.-
Primary  0.289  1.69  0.505  12.162  0.08  0.606
Secondary  0.155  0.77  0.228  513.664  2.85  0.164
Technical  -0.473  -0.98  0.036  1548.570  2.22  0.006
Post-secondary  0.154  0.38  0.024  20.573  0.05  0.018
University  0.086  0.33  0.105  279.492  1.06  0.055
Household  Characteristics
Age  0.196  3.26  57.292  0.414  0.05  63.964
Age squared  -0.001  -2.48  3371.800  -.-  -.-  -.-
Non-married  0.029  0.14  0.070  -133.580  -0.73  0.121
Female  0.482  3.64  0.203  218.701  1.50  0.388
Ill  0.052  0.48  0.538  -220.655  -1.97  0.636
Unemployed  0.360  3.13  0.316  -82.045  -0.71  0.545
Homeowner  0.282  2.36  0.686  -46.327  -0.39  0.764
Num.  Young  c/  -0.056  -0.29  0.971  -124.602  -0.69  1.08
Young  School  {/  0.115  0.60  0.935  102.624  0.56  1.04
No  Young  -0.146  -0.98  0.531  -.-  -.-  -.-
H.H.  size  -0.009  -0.43  5.338  26.080  1.16  4.56
Inv.  Mill's  ratio  -.-  -.-  -.-  -17.011  -0.08  1.23
Constant  -8.95  -4.67  1.00  134.826  0.14  1.00
Recipients  165  Observations  165
Observations  1121  R-squared  0.21
Log  likelihood  -380.57  F-statistic  2.121
Dependent  variable  mean  0.147  235.553
a/  In probit  analysis,  dependent  variable  Is tracisfer  receipt--transfer  receipt-i
if transfer  received,  0 otherwise.  In Generalized  Tobit  analysis,  dependent
variable  is  net transfer  amount  received. Sample: Households  aged  45 or  over.
_/  The reference  category  is  no  education.
c/  Number  of  children  living  outside  the  household.
d/  Number  of  children  living  outside  the  household  who are  in  school.- 86  -
probability  of transfer  receipt  by 11 percentage  points.  The level of
social  security  income  is  positively  related  to the  probability  of transfer
receipt,  but its effect  is negligible  and not statistically  significant.
Non-social security income (labeled simply "income" in Table 5.1) is
inversely  related  to transfer  receipt,  but the effect  is small and not
significant. At sample  means,  a 1,000  inti  increase  in income  reduces  the
probability  of receiving  a transfer  by only  a third  of a percentage  point.
So the most important  income  measure  in the transfer  probit  is the dummy
for  receipt  of Social  Security  income.
The probability  of receiving  a transfer  rises  with age,  up to age
83, then declines. At sample  means (age  57)  being one  year older  raises
the  p-abability  of transfer  receipt  by 1.7  percentage  points. The probit
results  indicate  that transfers  are  targeted  toward female-headed
households,  the unemployed  and homeowners. But education  is only weakly
related  to transfer  receipt.
The PLSS  asked  households  to report  the  number  of children  living
outside  the  household,  but,  unfortunately,  asked  only  about  those  under  the
age of 30.  The variable  "Num.  young" is the number  of young children
(under  30)  living  outside  the  household,  and  "Young  School"  is the  number
of them in school. And "No  Young"  is a dummy  that  takes  a value  of unity
if "Num.  Young"  equals  zero.  None of these  variables  have coefficients
significantly  different  from zero.  Over half of the transfer  recipients
have no young children  outside  the household,  so they must be receiving
transfers  from  children  over  30.
The  generalized  Tobit  estimates  are  given  ir the  last  three  columns
of Table 5.1.  Transfer  amounts  are higher  for those  with secondary  and
technical  education  (the  reference  category  is  no education)  and lower  for
those  who are ill.  Amounts  are also  higher  for female-headed  households,
larger  households  and  university  graduates;  these  coefficients  are  measured- 87 -
less precisely. None of the income  measures  in the generalized  Tobit is
statistically  significant.
Equations  for transfers  given  by younger  to older  generations  are
presented  in Table  5.2.  The sample  is restricted  to households  having  at
least  one living  parent. The probability  of giving  a transfer  rises  with
earnings, but at a diminishing  rate.  At sample means, a  1,000 inti
increase  in earnings  raises  the  probability  of giving  a transfer  by a half
a percentage  point.  The probability  of giving  also increases  with other
income.  Education  has a negligible  effect  on the  probability  of giving.
The probability  of giving  a transfer  rises  with age up to age 34, then
falls.  Female-headed  households  and the unemployed  are less likely to
give,  but the ill  are  more likely  to,  though  the  coefficient  on illness  is
significant  at only  the .15  level.
Education  levels  of parents  and spouse's  parents  are included  as
indicators  of pre-transfer  resources  of older  generation  members,  and  they
indicate  a mixed  pattern  for  transfers  given. For  example,  the  probability
of giving  is inversely  related  to the mother's  education  but positively
related  to the  spouse's  mother's  education.
Generalized  Tobit  estimates  for  transfer amounts given  are
presented  in the  right-hand  columns  of Table  5.2.  Transfer  amounts  given
increase  with donor earnings  but, as in the probit  equation  for giving,
education  has a  negligible  effect  on donations.  The  non-married  give  more,
and  amounts  given  increase  with the  mother's  education.
E.  Effects  of  Social  Security  on  Transfers  from  Young  to Old
We use the  estimates  in Tables  5.1  and  5.2  to answer  the  following
question:  How would  private  transfers  change  if social  security  pension
benefits  were taken  away?  We answer  this  question  by comparing  predicted
transfers  with  and  without  social  security.- 88  -
Table  5.2.  Probit  and  Generalized  Tobit  Estimates
Transfers  from  Young  to Old
Transfers  Given  a/
Probit  Generalized  Tobit
Asymptotic
Variable  Coefficient  t-value  Mean  Coefficient  t-value  Mean
Inceme
Earnings  0.105  x 10-3  2.79  1821.900  0.022  6.15  2171.100
Earnings  sqd.  -0.472  x 10-8  -1.79  0.142  x 108  .
Other  inc.  0.392  x 10-3  1.94  43.176  -0.036  -0.79  46.174
Education  _/
Initial  0.854  1.49  0.004  -66.137  -0.63  0.008
Primary  -0.116  -0.42  0.359  -8.458  -0.14  0.212
Secondary  0.097  0.34  0.331  -47.472  -0.76  0.388
Technical  0.081  0.26  0.058  -4.453  -0.07  0.069
Post-secondary  0.178  0.55  0.046  -60.356  -0.88  0.069
University  0.152  0.51  0.157  -39.232  -0.60  0.237
Household  Characteristics
Age  0.267  3.03  42.931  0.700  0.64  37.976
Aged  squared  -0.006  -3.01  1996.700
Age cubed  0.368  x 10-4  2.74  99945.000
Non-married  0.151  0.65  0.037  139.393  2.85  0.037
Female  -0.386  -2.38  0.172  -8.225  -0.23  0.057
Ill  0.119  1.50  0.501  -13.187  -0.84  0.510
Unemployed  -0.175  -1.49  0.217  40.985  1.62  0.110
Homeowner  -0.081  -0.98  0.535  11.853  0.74  0.441
H.H.  size  -0.119  -0.95  5.234  -4.085  -0.98  5.004
Num.  par.  Lb  0.062  -1.41  2.430  -10.677  -1.25  2.796
Fath.  ed.  0.017  1.22  4.670  -3.510  -1.27  5.306
Moth.  ed.  -0.038  -2.28  3.106  7.872  2.31  3.396
Sp. fath.  ed.  S/ -0.020  -1.56  4.676  0.863  0.32  4.833
Sp.  moth.  ed. c/  0.036  2.29  2.542  7.076  2.21  3.437
Inv.  Mill's
ratio  -.-  -.-  -.-  83.623  -2.10  1.444
Constant  -4.892  1.31  1.000  189.833  1.87  1.000
Donors  245  Observations  245
Observations  1875  R-squared  0.35
Log likelihood  -656.84  F-statistic  5.67
Dependent  variable  mean  0.131  141.386
a/  In probit analysis, transfer given--transfer given-l if transfer given, 0
otherwise.  In Generalized  Tobit analysis,  dependent  variable  is net transfer
amount given.  Sample:  Households  whose heads or spouses  have at least one
parent  living.
k/  Number  of  head's  and  spouse's  parents  alive.
c/  Spouse's  parentis  education.- 89 -
1.  Simulation  Results
Predicted transfers are the product of the predicted transfer
probability  and the  predicted  amount. Predicted  transfer  amounts  are the
products  of the  estimated  coefficient  vector  and  the  vector  of explanatory
variables:
A  A  A  A  A  A
Predicted - F(ao +  alh  +  bXh) x (cO +  cIh +  dXh),  (5.4)
where F is the normal  distribution  function. 20 Predicted  transfers  with
Social Security removed is equation (5.4)  with social-security  related
elements  of the  vector  Ih set  to  zero. Results  for  transfers  from  young  to
old  are  as follows:
Actual  mean  34.67
Predicted  mean  35.07
Predicted  mean  with social  security  income  set  to  zero  40.19
Removing  social  security  causes  a 5.12  inti increase  in predicted  private
transfers  received  by older  generations  from  younger  ones.  For the  whole
sample,  this implies  a total  boost in transfers  of 5,740 intis (5.12  x
1,121). Thus,  total  transfers  from  young to old in the  sample  would  rise
from 38,865  to 44,605. The  boost in transfers  amounts  to 12.9  percent  of
pre-Social Security transfers (5,740/44,605).
The 12.9  percent  figure  does  not take  into  account  the  effects  of
social  security's  removal  on giver  behavior. Taking  away social  security
increases  the disposable  earnings  of potential  givers  and, as the results
in  Table  5.2  indicate,  giving  is  positively  related  to earnings. We assume
the social security tax is fully shifted to workers so that they, in
effect, pay a  tax rate of 19 percent.  Removing the tax would raise
20/  Note that predicted transfer  amounts  are not conditioned  on actual
transfer  status  (the  inverse  Mill's  ratio  terms  and  their  coefficients
are not used in the imputations). The predicted  amounts,  then,  have
the interpretation of expected values of a  random draw from the
population  conditional  on the  vector.- 90  -
disposable  earnings  by 1/(1-.19)  - 23  percent. Performing  the  calculations
above  for the equations  in Table  5.2 yields  a predicted  increase  of 1.78
intis. 21 Using the sample in Table 5.1 as a basis for the aggregate
calculation  yields 1.78 x 1,121 - 1,995 extra intis transferred  due to
donor  earnings  effects. This  implies  aggregate  transfers  of 44,605  +  1,995
- 46,600.  The estimated  reduction  in transfers  due to social  security  is
(1,995  +  5,740)/46,600  - 16.6  percent. Another  way to express  the  results
is that,  without  social  security,  private  transfers  from  young  to old  would
have  been 20  percent  larger  ((1,995  +  5,740)/38,865).
These simtulation  results indicate that social security  has a
significant  impact  on private  transfers,  but its effect  is less than the
Barro-Becker  prediction  of complete  crowding  out.  We  now take  a closer
look  at the  estimates  in  Tables  5.1  and  5.2  and  interpret  them  in  the  light
of alternative  transfer  motives.
2.  Implications  for  Transfer  Motives
The evidence  on transfer  motives  in Tables  5.1 and 5.2 is  mixed,
but the ev'dence  in Table  5.1 does cast doubt  on the strict  Barro-Becker
altruism  mou!ve  for  private  transfers. The  altruism  model  predicts  an inti
for iLti reduction  in private  transfers  with increases  in recipient  pre-
trantsfer  income.  Instead,  two of the income  measures  in the generalized
Tobit equation  in Table 5.1 are positively  related to transfer  amounts
(though the coefficients  are not statistically  significant). And the
negative  coefficient  (social  security  income)  is significantly  different
from  -1  at the .01  level.
21/  Actual transfers  given for the sample in Table 5.2 is 13.10 intis.
Predicted  transfers  from the equations  in Table 5.2 were 12.45,  and
predicted  t:ansfers  without  social  security  were 14.23,  a difference  of
1.78.  Note that average  transfers  given  is much smaller  than average
transfers  received. A potential  explanation  for  the  d4screpancy  is  the
possibility  of  multiple  donors  when  children  make  transfers  to parents.- 91  -
Moreover, while  the probit coefficient  on receipt of social
security  income  is negative,  which  suggests  altruism,  probit  results  are  a
less  discriminating  test  of transfer  motives. The  reason  is that  negative
coefficients  on income  in  the  probit  are  consistent  with  exchange  motivated
transfers  as  well.  For  example,  having  less  income  lowers  the  supply  price
of providing inter-family  services  which increases the probability  of
receiving  an exchange  related transfer  (Cox, 1987).  The same argument
applies  to the  positive  coefficient  on  unemployment  status  in the  probit  in
Table  5.1.
Another  result  that is counter  to the  altruism  hypothesis  is the
finding  that  older  households  who are ill  receive  less than those  who are
not.  This result,  however,  is consistent  with inter-family  exchange  if
those  who  are ill  provide  fewer  services  than  those  who are  not.
One problem with making inferences  about transfer  motives  from
Table 5.1, however, is the lack of information  about potential donor
income.  For example,  a possible  reason  why the  coefficient  for  recipient
income is positive  is that the characteristics  of potential  donors  are
omitted from the equation.  Positive  correlation  between recipient  and
donor incomes  imparts  an upward  bias to the income  coefficients  in Table
5.1.
The  evidence casts doubt on some versions cf  the exchange
hypothesis  as  well.  For  example,  the  findings  for  giving  behavior  in  Table
2 indicate  that education  is only weakly  related  to transfers  given.  If
transfers  from  young  to  old  were  repayments  for  educational  loans,  we  would
expect  them  to  be positively  related  to  education.
Some of the evidence,  however,  is consistent  with inter-family
exchange. For  example,  the  findings  in  Table  5.1  indicate  that  females  are
much more likely  to receive  transfers. This evidence  is consistent  with- 92 -
evidence  from other countries  (Lucas  and Stark,  1985;  Botswana,  Kaufmann
and Lindauer,  1986;  El Salvador,  Cox, 1987;  United  States).  Part of the
reason  for the gender  difference  in transfers  received  may  be due to the
possibility  that women  are more involved  in inter-family  exchange  of in-
kind services. "Altruistic"  explanations,  such  as women  being  compensated
for deficiencies in earning potential, are less convincing since the
estimates  control  for  income. Part  of the  gender  difference  could  also  be
due to gender  differences  in life  expectancy,  resulting  in a targeting  of
private  transfers  to  widows.
Further,  some of the  evidence  points  to an insurance  function  of
transfers. For  example,  those  wno  are ill  are  actually  more  likely  to  give
a transfer  (coefficient  significant  at the .15  level). One explanation  is
that  those  prone  to illness  due  to,  say  lack  of good  water  supplies,  could
form insurance  schemes  with similar  households,  possibly  including  their
parents.  This type  of scheme  would increase  the incidence  of both gifts
and receipts  among households  who are affected  by illness.  Similarly,
unemployed  donors  give  larger  amounts  to their  parents  than  non-unemployed
donors  (coefficient  significant  at the .10  level),  which  is  consistent  with
the  private  insurance  idea.
F.  Social  Security  Health  Coverage  and  Private  Transfers
Next we  gauge the connection between social security  health
coverage  and  private  transfers. Table  5.3  contains  probit  and  generalized
Tobit  estimates  for transfers  received  using  the  entire  sample. The dummy
variable  for illness is interacted  with a dummy variable for social
security  coverage.  The latter  takes  on a value of one if the household
pays Social  Security  taxes  and  of zero  otherwise.- 93  -
Table  5.3.  Probit  and  Generalized  Tobit  Estimates
Entire  Sample
Transfers  Received  A/
Probit  Generalized  Tobit
Asymptotic
Variable  Coefficient  t-value  Mean  Coefficient  t-value  Mean
Income
Income  -0.372  x 10'4  -2.61  1946.900  0.011  0.94  1392.400
Education
Initial  0.060  0.14  0.005  88.514  0.24  0.005
Primary  0.112  0.80  0.388  -15.317  -0.14  0.396
Secondary  0.124  0.80  0.315  129.930  1.03  0.322
Technical  -0.017  -0.09  0.052  53.442  0.32  0.042
Post-secondary  0.202  0.95  0.041  145.247  0.83  0.040
University  0.095  0.53  0.145  276.018  1.85  0.125
Household  Characteristics
Age  -0.176  -3.37  45.855  0.127  0.07  46.972
Age  squared  0.003  2.69  2296.900
Age  cubed  -0.137  x 10-4  -1.98  0.124  x 10  -.-  -.-
Non-married  -0.154  -1.14  0.060  -61.707  -0.59  .076
Female  0.470  5.42  0.163  192.741  2.54  0.276
Ill,  no SS  k/  0.246  3.50  0.303  -92.336  -1.44  0.398
Ill,  has  SS  ./  0.128  1.62  0.204  -113.391  -1.59  0.199
Unemployed  0.393  5.42  0.242  143.201  1.98  0.394
Homeowner  -0.041  -0.63  0.563  61.328  1.09  0.542
H.H.  size  0.017  1.28  5.140  28.686  2.59  4.866
Num.  Young  4/  -0.183  -1.47  '5.635  -24.957  -0.24  0.565
Young  School  q/  0.181  1.40  0.593  23.331  0.22  0.539
Fath.  ed.  0.013  1.14  4.553  19.645  2.08  4.718
Moth.  ed.  0.494  x 10-3  0.04  3.+55  -0.855  -0.09  3.114
Inv.  Mill's
ratio  -.-  -.-  -.-  60.303  0.47  1.139
Constant  2.050  2.53  1.00  -248.905  -1.00  1.000
Recipients  568  Observations  568
Observations  2241  R-squared  0.08
Log-likelihood  -1171.10  F-statistic  2.43
Dependent  variable  mean  0.253  226.891
I/  n probit  analysis, dependent variable is transfer receipt--transfer-I  if
transfer received, 0 otherwise.  In Generalized Tobit analysis dependent
variable  is  net  transfer  emount  received.
/  Ill  during  the  last  four  weeks  and  not  covered  by social  security.
~/  Ill  during  the  last  four  weeks  and  covered  by social  security.
d/  Number  of children  living  outside  the  household.
j/  Number  of children  living  outside  the  household  who are  in  school.- 94 -
The probit  results  indicate  that  being ill  and not  being  covered
by social security raises the probability  of rransfer  receipt by 8.4
percentage  points.  Being ill and covered  by social  security  raises  the
probability  of transfer  receipt  as well,  but otily  by about  half as much.
The difference  is significant  at the .25  level.  The point estimates  for
the generalized Tobit  indicate that the ill without Social Security
coverage  receive  more than the ill  with coverage,  but the estimates  are
imprecise.
We use the same technique  above to figure  the boost in private
transfers  that  would  occur  if  social  security  were  removed. The  prediction
is  a 2.6  inti  increase  in  private  transfers  targeted  to  households  affected
by illness. The  average  transfer  received  for the  entire  sample  is 57.51
intis.  The results imply that transfers  would be 4.5 percent  higher
without  social  security  health  coverage.
G.  Conclusions
In Peru, private inter-household  transfers  make an important
contribution  to the  income  of vulnerable  groups  such  as the  elderly. This
has an important  public policy implication;  namely that the effects  of
public transfers  to such vulnerable  groups  may be mitigated  if private
transfers  are reduced. There  is some  evidence  that  this  happens  in Peru.
Households  whose heads receive  social  security  pension income  are less
likely (by 11 percent) to receive private transfers.  Without social
security,  the  amount  of  private  transfers  from  young  to  old  would  have  been
20 percent larger.  There is also some evidence  that private transfers
compensate  for  the  availability  of  public  health  benefits.- 95 -
While  significant,  these  findings  are  not  consistent  with  a  purely
altruistic  model of giving,  which predicts  a one-to-one  substitution  for
public  giving. They are  consistent  with theories  of  exchange  and  private
insurance.- 96  -
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